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1. CHAPTER
Everyday market and non-market activities require spending effort. In
economics it is common to assume that exerting effort yields a positive
productive outcome but also yields disutility for the individual, both typically
within the same period; likewise, there can also be a diminishing marginal
productivity of effort, again within the same period.
There have been, however, influential models in the early 2000s -
primarily designed to explain the ‘Equity Premium Puzzle’ - that consider
DMs with non-time-separable utility functions in consumption. Barberis,
Huang & Santos (2001) considered DMs who “derive direct utility not only
from consumption but also [utility] from fluctuations in the value of their ...
wealth. They are loss averse over these fluctuations” (p. 1). Fuhrer (2000)
considered a model “in which consumers’ utility depends in part on current
consumption relative to past consumption ” (p. 367). This approach in general
is related to the “prospect theory” of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which
demonstrated that a typical individual in real-life evaluates her outcomes as
a gain or loss rather than just the value of outcome. That is, in addition
to just acquiring the period’s outcome, it is important for an individual to
understand how good or bad she performs in comparison to what she expects.
This expectation is defined as a reference point.1
1 In descriptive theories of decision-making under uncertainty, the distinction between
gains and losses has received considerable attention. DMs do not appear to integrate
outcomes with their wealth or existing consumption level, as normally assumed in expected
utility theory. Rather individuals appear to react to events as changes, relative to some natural
reference point. This observation was first made by Markowitz (1952).
It is needless to mention that loss aversion and gain fondness also induces
preferences for particular patterns of decision-making over time. Significant
attention in literature has been paid to the concept of loss aversion which,
among other reasons, explains why people deviate from expected utility.
People not only interpret outcomes as a gain or loss relative to a reference
point but are also more sensitive to losses than to gains. Many studies have
found evidence of loss aversion (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1990; Tversky and
Kahneman 1991; Barberis, Huang & Santos 2001). In this thesis, I continue
to consider the case of loss aversion together with gain fondness, i.e., when the
DM is more sensitive to gain than to loss. For example, when a young tennis
player is just at the beginning of her career, she knows that the path will be
strewn with obstacles and losses, and therefore she is more likely to suffer
less from the loss but experience more enjoyment from even a small win. The
gain-loss asymmetry has figured prominently in theories of motivation, goal
pursuit and decision-making. Focusing on preventing a loss versus achieving
a gain or on achieving a gain versus preventing a loss activates very different
kinds of psychological states, behaviours, decisions and choices.
In addition, many decisions and choices have a time dimension, and
reference points are also important in intertemporal choice (Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1992). While the standard theory based on expected utility
assumes that choices are time invariant in a routine setup, Kahneman and
Thaler (1991) demonstrated that individuals actually base their decisions
on experience(s) that they had in the past.2 As is the case in Barberis
& Huang (2001) and Fuhrer (2000), such an analysis typically involves
comparisons to past performance. The general framework that is analysed
2 Loewenstein (1988) pointed out that in situations when past consumption levels set
reference points for future consumption, individuals may prefer an increasing consumption
profile. The preference for a rising consumption profile helps explain an anomaly in labor
markets, for example, such as wages rising with age even when productivity is not (Medoff
and Abraham, 1980).
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in this thesis also involves comparisons to past performance, and therefore is
a reference-dependent one in nature.
Another direction not fully adhering to time-separability of utility
functions is considered by Dragone (2009). He based his analysis on
evidence that, in addition to disutility of work, many tasks exerting effort
is also costly because it is fatiguing and that the current fatigue negatively
affects the performance of the tasks to be performed in the future.3 The
evidence that Dragone (2009) cites supports this view both for physical and
for cognitive activities. In physiology, for instance, well-established literature
shows that muscle contraction involves the depletion of energy signalling
the onset of fatigue, and that energy deficiency is a major cause of low
performance (see, among others, Sahlin, Tonkonogi and Söderlund, 1998).
Similar conclusions have been reached with respect to high-level cognitive
activities as well (Dorrian, Lamond and Dawson, 2000; Rogers, Dorrian and
Dinges, 2003). Nevertheless, in many situations people must exert effort for
prolonged periods of time and empirical evidence shows that this seriously
influences performance. Similar degrading patterns in performance when
prolonged effort is exerted are common in many activities people do. In
competitive sports, for instance, competitive athletes who exert a lot of effort
in a particular game are not expected to maintain the same effort intensity
in the next game that follows in a few days; there is already literature
which studies the effect of recovery strategies on such demanding physical
3 Ryvkin (2011) considers fatigue in dynamic tournaments. In his model too current
fatigue affects future performance.
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performance (see Montgomery et al, 2008). 4 Interestingly, although fatigue
affecting future performance was already noted at the beginning of the 20th
century by economists such as Chapman (1909), Florence (1924), Marshall
(1920) and Vernon (1921), this approach has been abandoned for a long time
afterwards. 5
In economic literature, as alluded to before, effort is generally taken into
account by assuming that it is a productive input, but it yields disutility for the
DM. Within this standard approach, Marchetti and Nucci (2001) combined the
usual assumption that effort yields disutility with another usual assumption
that the marginal disutility of hourly effort rises with the number of hours,
showing that, once the number of hours per worker reaches a critical threshold
value, fatigue sets in and the marginal hour is worked with decreasing
effort. Garcia-Sanchez and Vazquez-Mendez (2005), with a different focus,
observed that fatigue can affect the instantaneous production function of a
firm (through influencing the effective working time), with the consequence
that different work schedules could be optimal depending on the individual
preferences for leisure and on whether the fatigue constraint really binds or
not. On the other hand, in a more behavioral setup, Akerlof et al (1990)
introduced the fair wage-effort hypothesis in which workers proportionately
withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short of their fair wage.
In this thesis, on the other hand, in a nutshell I will incorporate the
directions mentioned above into a very basic dynamic effort choice model
4 Parallel to the physiological argument on physical resource depletion, the psychological
literature explains this evidence on the basis of a limited stock of cognitive resources
(Kahneman, 1973). In either case, the exhaustion of the stock of physical resources or
cognitive resources impairs performance. Thus, these resources in a sense resemble a car
battery. Once they are depleted, they need to be recharged for future performance.
5 Nevertheless, an enormous number of research articles have been published on the topic
of fatigue and its effect on physical and physiological functions in other literatures (see, for
example, Abd-Elfattah et al, 2015).
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in a general way, where effort is costless. In doing so, I will consider
a forward-looking DM, who discounts the future, and who is choosing an
effort level in each period - where as usual a higher effort level generates a
higher level of productive outcome - in a fully dynamic history-dependent
environment by simultaneously considering past, present and future, mainly
in a finite-horizon setup. The remainder of this introductory chapter will
provide a summary of the basics of my framework, its main concepts and its
main results, which will be pursued in detail in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter
5 will conclude.
In Chapter 2, I will consider the case that the DM’s effort in one period
does not have any negative or positive bearing on the following period’s
effort, which I will term the Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence
(ZIEI). In that chapter the DM does not compare her consecutive outcomes
in adjacent periods, and thus will not encounter any loss aversion or any
gain fondness between adjacent periods due to fluctuations in the values of
her outcomes in consecutive periods, which I will term the Intertemporal
Reference Independence (IRI) (I will elaborate on loss aversion and gain
fondness as well as reference dependence shortly). Chapter 2 will only
consider “IRI”. Then I will show that in the ZIEI and IRI case, the DM will
choose the maximum possible effort level every period. I will then consider
“fatigue” due to higher effort in one period affecting the effort level of the
next period negatively, which I will term the Negative Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (NIEI). Note that the opposite situation would be a higher
effort in one period affecting the effort level in the next period positively -
possibly due to the learning-by-doing effect - which I will term the Positive
Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (PIEI).6 In the NIEI and IRI case, I will
6 The concept of learning-by-doing has played a central role in economics since Arrow
(1963) introduced the concept. According to learning-by-doing, higher productivity is
achieved through practice, self-perfection as well as minor innovations. An example
is a factory that increases output by learning how to use equipment/machines better
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show that the DM will start with the highest possible effort level and follow up
with the lowest possible effort level the next period, following this alternating
up-and-down pattern throughout. In the PIEI and IRI case, however, it turns
out that the DM will still choose the maximum possible effort level for every
period as in the ZIEI and IRI case.7
In Chapters 3 and 4, I consider a DM who - as opposed to Intertemporal
Reference Independence (IRI) - has Intertemporal Reference Dependence
(IRD) instead, i.e., the DM will compare her consecutive outcomes in adjacent
periods, and thus, apart from her standard direct utility from the outcome
of her choice of effort in each period, the DM will also get a reference
payoff gain from an increase in the outcome or suffer a reference payoff loss
from a decrease in the outcome (unless her outcomes are exactly the same in
consecutive periods). I will call it Intertemporal Gain Fondness. Specifically,
the gain-fondness coefficient λ+ > 0 of the DM will determine the extent
of the reference utility increase she will experience from her intertemporal
outcome increment. Likewise, the DM will experience a reference utility
without adding workers or significant amounts of physical capital/equipment (For example,
Lundberg, 1961, demonstrated that, the Horndal iron works plant in Sweden, even without
any new investment over a period of 15 years, raised output per worker hour by 2% per
annum). Doing refers to the capability of workers to improve their productivity by regularly
repeating the same type of action. Lucas (1988) considered learning-by-doing as a main
catalyst of productivity growth and increasing returns to human capital.
7 Another motivation for the PIEI (though perhaps less effective than the
learning-by-doing effect) could be found in the following vignette that is familiar to
academics in economics: It would not be an exaggeration to state that many aspiring
economists would want to work and/or co-author with star economists, even if these aspiring
economists may have to do most of the work, so that the star economists would agree to
put their magic touch - or at least their name - on their joint work (and presumably such a
situation would not be unique to economics). In other words, once one gets very prominent
(e.g., one wins the Nobel Prize or comes close to it), there will be other academics who
would be willing to share co-authorship with them at almost any cost and consequently these
prominent academics can easily produce more papers.
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decrease from any loss, i.e., from any decline in her outcome compared to the
previous period. I will call it Intertemporal Loss Aversion. In that case, her
loss-aversion coefficient λ− > 0 will determine the extent of the reference
utility decrease she will experience from that intertemporal outcome drop.
IRD will be present if λ− > 0 and/or λ+ > 0.
In Chapter 3, I first consider the ZIEI and IRD case with λ−> λ+ (i.e., the
“λ−-dominant” case) which is the typical or most probable case considered
in the reference-dependence literature. In this setup, the DM behaves like a
standard DM, i.e., just like the one in the ZIEI and IRI, when λ+ is relatively
low in that she chooses the highest effort level every period. When λ+ is
relatively high and she does not discount the future much, however, the DM
starts with a low level of effort - and thus a low level of outcome - in the
first period, but behaves just like a standard DM thereafter, by choosing the
highest possible effort level in every period from then on. (I also show that this
behaviour of the DM is robust to full commitment - and thus it coincides with
a social planner’s optimal plan). I then consider the ZIEI and IRD case with
λ+ > λ−, (i.e., the “λ+ -dominant” case). In this case, my results turn out to
be the same as those of the λ+≤ λ− case whenever λ+ does not exceed λ− by
much. When λ+ exceeds λ− significantly, however, a much richer dynamic
may arise, and fluctuating or volatile effort levels can become standard under
some parameters: thus, the DM may even prefer first taking a loss so that
she can then enjoy a gain in the next period when her discounting is strong.
Further she may prefer following this up-and-down effort path throughout, as
long as she finishes everything on a good note, i.e., with the highest possible
effort and thus outcome. (However, in this case the DM’s behaviour is no
longer robust to any level of commitment, and it does not coincide with a
social planner’s optimal path any longer.)
In Chapter 4, I continue considering a DM who has Intertemporal
Reference Dependence (IRD). I consider the NIEI (Negative Intertemporal
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Efforts Interdependence) and the PIEI (Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence) cases along with IRD. Via NIEI, this chapter introduces
fatigue in a dynamic behavioral model of intertemporal decision-making. The
critical assumption is that the DM again has a certain amount of maximum
effort potential that is depleted or recovered depending on effort exertion.
The analysis in this NIEI and IRD case shows that it is not optimal to provide
a constant effort path or an up-and-down effort path, as this would neglect the
endogenous cost of effort on the dynamics of fatigue, where this cost could
also be magnified through IRD. Specifically, in the NIEI and IRD case it turns
out that regardless of the extent of her Intertemporal Loss Aversion and/or the
extent of her Intertemporal Gain Fondness (i.e., regardless of λ− R λ+), any
DM’s choice of effort path is the same and strongly monotonic over the entire
time horizon. In the PIEI and IRD case, I first consider a λ−-dominant DM
(i.e., with λ− > λ+). I find that the DM behaves like an IRI agent (i.e.,
with λ− = λ+ = 0), who always chooses the highest effort level in every
period; that is, her effort path always involves the highest possible effort.
Next, I consider the case λ+ > λ−. In this case too, the DM chooses a path
where her effort level is always at the maximum possible level after the first
period, while her first period effort (1) too is at the maximum possible level if
her discount factor is not sufficiently high, and (2) is less than the maximum
possible level when her discount factor is sufficiently high.
To sum it up, when we have IRI, there is already significant variation
between the DM’s effort paths depending on ZIEI, PIEI (the DM choosing
the maximum effort level all the way) vs NIEI (the DM alternating between
the highest and lowest possible levels of effort). When we have IRD, even
within ZIEI there is a significant but even richer variation between the DM’s
effort paths, depending on whether λ− > λ+ or not. With λ− > λ+ the
DM always chooses the maximum effort level, while with λ+ > λ− basically
anything goes, i.e., the DM may always choose the maximum effort level
15
or alternate between the highest and lowest possible effort levels (and also
choose some other variations of those effort paths). When we have IRD with
NIEI, however, surprisingly the DM’s effort path becomes strictly monotone
increasing, and this is so regardless of λ− R λ+. On the other hand, such a
strictly monotone-increasing effort path is not exhibited by the DM when we
have IRD with PIEI. In that latter case, there is no full convergence of the
effort paths of the λ− -dominant and λ+ -dominant DMs as opposed to the
NIEI and IRD case; nevertheless, there is very strong resemblance between
the effort paths of the of the λ− -dominant and λ+ -dominant DMs: the λ−
-dominant DM exhibits an effort path of the maximum possible effort level in
each period (i.e., just like that of the DM in the ZIEI and IRI case) while the
λ+ -dominant DM exhibits either the very same effort path or an effort path
where she starts with a less than maximum effort level but then quickly moves
to the maximum possible effort level in all remaining periods (i.e., almost like
that of the DM in some effort paths in the ZIEI and IRI case, but this time not
starting with the lowest possible effort level).
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2. CHAPTER
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, as I have mentioned before in the introductory chapter, first
I will consider the most basic case, namely the Zero Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (ZIEI) and the Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI)
case. As also mentioned before, I show that the DM will pick the maximum
possible effort level every period. This behavior is the same whether the DM
is the social planner or a decentralised agent. I also show that incorporating
disutility of effort does not affect the outcome qualitatively and that neither
does any diminishing marginal productivity of effort.
Then I extend this simplest possible framework slightly by keeping the
IRI feature but considering the Negative Intertemporal Effort Interdependence
(NIEI) and the Positive Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (PIEI). I show
that in the NIEI and IRI case, the DM starts with the highest possible effort
level and then follows up with the lowest possible effort level, following this
alternating up-and-down pattern throughout. In the PIEI and IRI case, the DM
still chooses the maximum possible effort level every period. I also note that
incorporating any disutility of effort or any diminishing marginal productivity
of effort makes the NIEI and PIEI case intractable. With NIEI and PIEI, I thus
only consider the case where there is no disutility of effort or no diminishing
marginal productivity of effort.
2.2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, I introduce the basic definitions and notions that I will use
throughout the whole discussion.
First, I use the following notations throughout the discussion: et is an
effort (i.e, an effort level) at any period t. u(et) is the standard direct utility,
λ+ and λ− are positive numbers. Next, I introduce the definitions that I will
use further.
The following definition introduces the case when the DM is a standard
agent who does not have any intertemporal linkages of efforts.
DEFINITION 1: Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (ZIEI) is
defined as DM’s effort in a period which does not have any negative or
positive bearing on the following period’s effort, i.e, the standard direct utility
is defined as u(et) = et ∀t ≥ 1 and et ∈ [0,1].
The following definition introduces intertemporal linkage of efforts between
periods through the existence of fatigue that the DM can experience when
exerting a high level of efforts.
DEFINITION 2: Negative Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (NIEI) is
defined as DM’s effort in a period which does have a negative effect on the
following period’s effort, i.e, the standard direct utility is defined as u(et) =
(1− et−1)et ∀t ≥ 1 and et ∈ [0,1].
DEFINITION 3: Positive Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (PIEI) is
defined as DM’s effort in a period which does have a positive effect on the
following period’s effort, i.e, the standard direct utility is defined as u(et) =
et−1et ∀t ≥ 1 and et ∈ [0,1].
The above definition introduces the case when exerting a high level of
effort brings a positive effect or additional benefit in the next period, such
18
as, for example, pure peer effect (i.e., co-authorship). If an academic is very
productive in terms of research output, it creates a positive reputation and
attracts others for future co-authorships.
DEFINITION 4: The DM is λ−-dominant if λ− > λ+, where λ+ and λ− are
positive real numbers
DEFINITION 5: Intertemporal Loss Aversion (ILA) is defined as the case
where λ− > λ+.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to such an agent as a λ−-dominant
DM.
The above definition introduces loss aversion which refers to the tendency
for the DM to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. The DM
compares her consecutive outcomes in adjacent periods and suffers more from
a decrease in the payoffs than she enjoys from an increase in the outcomes.
The following definitions introduce gain fondness that refers to the
tendency for the DM to strongly prefers acquiring gain than avoiding losses.
In this case, the DM also compares her consecutive outcomes in adjacent
periods, but she enjoys an increase in the outcomes more than suffers from a
decrease in the payoffs.
DEFINITION 6: The DM is λ+-dominant if λ− ≤ λ+, where λ+ and λ− are
positive real numbers.
DEFINITION 7: Intertemporal gain fondness (IGF) is defined as the case
when λ− < λ+.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to such an agent as a λ+ -
dominant DM.
The following definition introduces the case where the DM does not
compare her consecutive outcomes in adjacent periods, and thus will not
encounter any loss aversion or any gain fondness between adjacent periods.
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DEFINITION 8: If λ− = λ+ = 0, there is Intertemporal Reference
Independence (IRI).
The following definition introduces the case where the DM will compare
her consecutive outcomes in adjacent periods, and thus, apart from her
standard direct utility from the outcome of her choice of effort in each period,
the DM will also get a reference payoff gain and/or suffer a reference payoff
loss unless her outcomes are exactly the same in consecutive periods.
DEFINITION 9: If λ− > 0 and/or λ+ > 0, then there is Intertemporal
Reference Dependence (IRD).
2.3 MODEL
I consider a DM who takes part in the following finite dynamic task. Time is
discrete and there are T ≥ 2 periods, with T <∞. In each period t = 1, . . . ,T ,
the DM has to take a costless action (i.e., an effort level) et ∈ [0,1] that yields
a direct utility of u(et) > 0 in period t with certainty.1 An effort path is
denoted by e = (e1, . . . ,eT ) ∈ [0,1]T . Given an effort path e = (e1, . . . ,eT ),
I say that the DM has an intertemporal gain in period t ≥ 2 if u(et)> u(et−1)
and has an intertemporal loss if u(et)< u(et−1). Given an intertemporal gain,
the DM experiences a reference utility gain of λ+(u(et)− u(et−1)) while
with an intertemporal loss, the DM experiences a reference utility loss of
λ−(u(et−1)− u(et)), where λ+ and λ− are positive real numbers. Thus,
λ− is the loss-aversion coefficient of the DM while λ+ is her gain-fondness
coefficient.
Clearly when t = 1, the notions of intertemporal loss or intertemporal
gain are not applicable. Thus, the DM’s period t ≥ 2 utility from the effort
1 The total DM’s outcome is defined as a sum of monetary or/and non-pecuniary payoffs
(i.e., u(et) = umon(et) + unonp(et)). However, I am not going to discuss these payoffs
separately.
20
path e = (e1, . . . ,eT ) is vt(e) = u(et)+λ+(u(et)−u(et−1)) if u(et)> u(et−1)
and vt(e) = u(et)− λ−(u(et−1)− u(et)) if u(et) < u(et−1). Given v(·), the
DM chooses e ∈ [0,1]T to maximise her discounted sum of utility given by
Vδ (e) = u(e1)+
T
∑
t=2
δ t−1vt(e), (2.1)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is her time discount factor.
2.3.1 THE ZIEI CASE: u(et) = et
First, I consider the case of Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence
(ZIEI) (i.e., u(et) = et) with Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI)
(i.e., λ− = λ+ = 0); that is, there exists no intertemporal linkage between
periods.
Consider two cases: (1) the DM is a social planner and (2) she is a
decentralised agent.2 In the first case, with the DM as the social planner,
then her discounted payoff over time is Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et). As a result,
it is easy to verify that the DM’s payoff is at maximum only if the effort
each period is et = 1, ∀t. Suppose that the DM decides to deviate from this
effort path and her choice is to take et = xt , where xt ∈ [0,1). As a result,
the DM’s payoff is Vδ (et = xt) = x1 + δx2 + . . .+ δT−1xT . Comparing these
two payoffs, I have Vδ (et = 1)>Vδ (et = xt). To summarise, if the DM is the
social planner, her optimal effort at each period is e∗t = 1 ∀t.
Next, I consider the case when the DM is a decentralised agent. Suppose
that she is at period T , then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = eT . As a result,
maximum payoff at period T is reached only if the effort is eT = 1. Consider
2 The following term “social planner” is used to describe the DM who makes a decision by
choosing - and committing to - effort levels over all periods of time to achieve the best result
for all periods involved, maximising her total payoff. She follows this optimal effort path
over all periods without any deviations. The term “decentralized agent” is used to describe
the DM who makes a decision about optimal effort level that maximizes payoff of the period
t and can reconsider her choice every period.
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the DM at period T − 1. Hence, her payoff is Vδ (eT−1) = eT−1 + δeT =
eT−1 + δ1. As a result, her action (i.e., an effort) at period T − 1 is eT−1 =
1, as well. Continuing the same logic, the equilibrium effort path is e =
(1,1, . . . ,1,1). To prove it, let’s consider the following lemmas.
LEMMA 1: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any t > 1 and δ ∈ (0,1), the
optimal effort is e∗t = 1.
Proof The proof invokes an induction method. Let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be
an equilibrium. Consider the statement S(n) such that eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 =
1, . . . ,eT = 1. From that we infer that S(0) and S(1) are true. Suppose that
the statement S(n) is true as well; that is, eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 = 1, . . . ,eT =
1. Let’s now consider the statement S(n+ 1). The DM’s payoff at period
T−(n+1) is Vδ (eT−(n+1)) = eT−(n+1)+δeT−n+δ 2eT−n−1+ . . .+δ n−1eT =
eT−(n+1)+δ1+δ 21+ . . .+δ n1. As a result, the effort at period T −(n+1) is
eT−(n+1) = 1, therefore, the statement S(n+1) is true as well. To summarise,
the effort in each period t > 1 is et = 1. This concludes the proof. 
Now let’s assume that the DM is at period t = 1.
LEMMA 2: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for t = 1 and any δ ∈ (0,1), the
optimal effort is e∗1 = 1.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et).
According to Lemma 1, we have Vδ (e) = e1+δ1+δ 21+ . . .+δT−11. As a
result, e1 = 1. This concludes the proof. 
The following proposition provides the general result of this section:
PROPOSITION 1: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k∈{1,T},
the equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).3
3 I say that the DM has k - commitment power, k = 1, . . . ,T , if at any period t she can
implement any k-length effort path et , . . . ,emin{T,t+k}. When k = T I say the DM has full
commitment power while if k = 1 she has no commitment power.
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This means that when the DM has Zero Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (ZIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI),
then irrespective of her time discounting, the DM will exert full effort whether
she has full or no commitment.
2.3.2 THE NIEI CASE: u(et) = (1− et−1)et
Now, I consider the case of Negative Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (NIEI) (i.e., u(et) = (1− et−1)et) with Intertemporal
Reference Independence (IRI) (i.e., λ− = λ+ = 0); that is, there exists
an intertemporal linkage of efforts but there is no intertemporal reference
dependence. In other words, this is the case where exerting high level of
effort in one period leads to accumulation of fatigue in the subsequent period.
Let’s consider the following example of T = 2. Suppose that the DM is the
social planner, and for the sake of simplicity, I assume that at the beginning,
her horizon is only one period, that is T = 1. As a result, the DM’s payoff is
V (e1) = e1. Therefore, the DM’s effort is e1 = 1. Now suppose that the DM’s
horizon is two periods, i.e., T = 2. The DM’s payoff is Vδ (et) = e1+δ (e2(1−
e1))= e1(1−δe2)+δe2. The DM’s choice of efforts et is interdependent, that
is her choice of e1 affects the effort of the next period, that is e2 is a function
of e1, with (1− e1)e2. If δ < 1e2 the DM’s effort in the first period is e1 = 1.
However, if δ = 1, the effort path could be any of e = (1,0) or e = (0,1).
Next, suppose that the DM is a decentralised agent, and she is at the last
period. Her payoff at this period is V (e2) = e2(1− e1). For any e1 , 1 and
∀δ ∈ (0,1), the DM’s effort is e2 = 1. If DM is at the period t = 1, the payoff
is Vδ (et) = e1 + δ (e2(1− e1)) = e1(1− δ1) + δ1. If δ = 1, that is when
V = e1+e2(1−e1), her first period payoff could be e1 = 0 and then the effort
path is e = (0,1), or it could be e1 = 1 and then her effort path is e = (1,0).
Consider the DM who is the social planner. Then I have the following
lemma:
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LEMMA 3: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), if T is even and
T > 2, the effort path e is such that et = 1 if t is odd and et = 0 if t is even.
Proof If T is even, it can be considered as a combination of two-period strings.
As we have gone over the T = 2 case, for now suppose that T = 4, therefore
it consists of a combination of two two-period strings. The DM’s payoff is
V = e1+δe2(1−e1)+δ 2e3(1−e2)+δ 3e4(1−e3) = e1(1−δe2)+δe2(1−
δe3) + δ 2e3(1− δe4) + δ 3e4. Her effort et affects her choice of the level
of effort of the next period et+1 in the form of (1− et)et+1. As a result, if
δ < 1 and if the effort is e1 = 1, then in the next period the fatigue state is
1−e1 = 1−1= 0 and regardless of her effort in the second period, the utility
in that period is 0. Her effort choice in t = 2 affects her effort in period t = 3,
and because the fatigue state at this period is 1−e2 = 1−0= 1, therefore, the
DM’s effort choice at period 3 is e3 = 1. Consequently, in the next period the
DM experiences fatigue; that is 1−e3 = 1−1 = 0, and the level of effort that
is chosen by the DM is e4 = 0
Now suppose that the DM wants to deviate and choose another effort
xt at period t, i.e., et = xt , where xt ∈ (0,1). As a result, her payoff is
Vδ (x1,x2,x3,x4)= x1+δx2(1−x1)+δ 2x3(1−x2)+δ 3x4(1−x3). Comparing
this payoff to V (1,0,1,0) = 1 + δ0 + δ 21 + δ 30, we have V (1,0,1,0) >
Vδ (x1,x2,x3,x4). Consequently, the combination of two-period strings {1,0}
dominates any others. This concludes the proof. 
REMARK 1: If δ = 1, the effort path could be any of {0,1} or {1,0}. The
DM’s payoff is V = e1+ e2(1− e1)+ e3(1− e2)+ e4(1− e3) = e1(1− e2)+
e2(1− e3)+ e3(1− e4)+ e4. In the case of {0,1} the payoff is V ({0,1}) =
0+ 1+ 0+ 1. In the case of {1,0}, the payoff is V ({1,0}) = 1+ 0+ 1+ 0.
These payoffs are the same.
LEMMA 4: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1) if T is odd, the
effort path represents the combination of two periods plus one, i.e., such that
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et = 1 if t is odd and et = 0 if t is even.
Proof If T is the odd number of periods, we can consider that as a combination
of two-period strings plus one-period string. According to Lemma 3, the
effort path for any two periods is {1,0}. Let’s consider the case T = 3. The
DM’s payoff is V = e1+δe2(1−e1)+δ 2e3(1−e2) = e1(1−δe2)+δe2(1−
δe3)+δ 2e3. If δ < 1, the effort e1 = 1, then in the next period the fatigue state
is 1− e1 = 1− 1 = 0 and because the fatigue state at this period is 1− e2 =
1−0= 1, regardless of her effort in the second period, the utility in that period
is 0. Her effort choice in t = 2 affects her effort in period t = 3, and because
the fatigue state at this period is 1−e2 = 1−0= 1, therefore, the DM’s effort
choice at period 3 is e3 = 1.
Suppose that the DM wants to deviate and choose the effort xt at period t
i.e., et = xt , where xt ∈ (0,1). As a result, her payoff is Vδ (x1,x2,x3) = x1+
δx2(1− x1)+ δ 2x3(1− x2). Comparing this payoff to V (1,0,1) = 1+ δ0+
δ 21, we have V (1,0,1) > Vδ (x1,x2,x3). As a result, this path {1,0}+ {1}
dominates. This concludes the proof. 
LEMMA 5: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), the effort path
e∗= (1,0,1,0 . . .) dominates any others such as e∗∗= (x1,x2,x3,x4, . . .), ∀xt ∈
[0,1).
Proof We are going to demonstrate the following case by selecting the effort
path that starts with the highest effort and in the subsequent period the lowest
level of effort, 0, and then vacillating between the two efforts thereafter. My
contention is that this effort path dominates any other effort path. To that
end, suppose that e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) is an equilibrium effort path, such that
e∗=(1,0,1,0, . . .). Then the DM’s payoff is V (1,0,1,0, . . .)= 1+δ0+δ 21+
δ 30+ . . .. Now suppose that there exists other equilibrium paths, such as, for
example, 0,1,0,1, . . . or x,y,z,w, . . ., where x,y,z,w∈ (0,1). The DM’s payoff
of 0,1,0,1, . . . is V (0,1,0,1, . . .)= 0+δ1+δ 20+δ 31+ . . .. The DM’s payoff
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of x,y,z,w, . . . is V (x,y,z,w, . . .) = x+δy(1− x)+δ 2z(1− y)+δ 3w(1− y)+
. . ..
We will now compare payoffs V (1,0,1,0, . . .) ≶ V (0,1,0,1, . . .).
Consequently, 1+ δ0+ δ 21+ δ 30+ . . .− [0+ δ1+ δ 20+ δ 31+ . . .] > 0.
Therefore, e∗ = (1,0,1,0, . . .) dominates 0,1,0,1, . . .. Now let’s check
V (1,0,1,0, . . .) ≶ V (x,y,z,w, . . .). As a result, we have V (1,0,1,0, . . .)−
V (x,y,z,w, . . .) = 1+ δ0+ δ 21+ δ 30+ . . .− [x+ δy(1− x) + δ 2z(1− y) +
δ 3w(1− y)+ . . .] > 0. Hence, the effort path e∗ = (1,0,1,0, . . .) dominates
any other effort path for the DM. This concludes the proof. 
To summarise these findings, I provide the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1) and for T > 2,
the the optimal effort path presents either the combination of {1,0} if T is
even, or the combination of two periods plus one, i.e., {1,0}+ {1}, if T is
odd. This effort path e∗ = (1,0,1,0 . . .) dominates any others.
This means that when the DM has Negative Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (NIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI),
then irrespective of her time discounting, the DM will start with the highest
possible effort level and follow up with the lowest possible effort level in the
next period, and following this alternating up-and-down pattern throughout.
2.3.3 THE PIEI CASE: u(et) = et−1et
In this section I consider the case of Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (PIEI) (i.e., u(et) = et−1et) with Intertemporal Reference
Independence (IRI) (i.e., λ− = λ+ = 0); that is, there exists an intertemporal
linkage of efforts, but there is no intertemporal reference dependence. In other
words, this is the case where a high level of effort in one period brings about
a positive impact on the DM’s effort in the subsequent period.
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I consider two cases, (1) the DM is a social planner and (2) she is a
decentralised agent. First, suppose that the DM is the social planner, then her
expected payoff over time is Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et) = e1+∑
T
t=2 δ t−1et−1et .
As a result, it is easy to verify that the DM’s payoff is at maximum only if the
effort at each period is et = 1 ∀t. Suppose that the DM decides to deviate from
this effort path and her choice is et = xt ∀t, where xt ∈ [0,1). Consequently,
the DM’s payoff is Vδ (et = xt) = x1+δx1x2+ . . .+δT−1xT−1xT . Comparing
these two payoffs, I obtain Vδ (et = 1)>Vδ (et = xt). To summarise, if the DM
is the social planner, her optimal effort at each period is e∗t = 1 ∀t.
Now, suppose that the DM is a decentralised agent and she is at period
T . Then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = eT eT−1. As a result, the DM’s effort at
period T is eT = 1. Now assume the DM is at period T −1. Hence, her payoff
is Vδ (eT−1) = eT−1eT−2 + δeT eT−1 = eT−1eT−2 + δ1eT−1. Consequently,
her effort at period T − 1 is eT−1 = 1. Now let’s assume that the DM is
at period T − 2. Hence, her payoff is V (eT−2) = eT−2e∗T−3 + δeT−1eT−2 +
δ 2eT eT−1 = eT−2e∗T−3+δ1e
∗
T−2+δ
21 = eT−2(e∗T−3+δ )+δ
2. As a result,
the DM’s effort at period T −2 is eT−2 = 1. Continuing the same logic, one
can see that her equilibrium effort path will be e= (1,1, . . . ,1,1). To prove it,
let’s consider the following lemmas.
LEMMA 6: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T and t > 1, e∗t = 1.
Proof To prove this lemma, we invoke an induction approach. Let e∗ =
(e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an equilibrium. Consider the statement S(n) such that
eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 = 1, . . . ,eT = 1. We infer that S(0) and S(1) are true.
Suppose that the statement S(n) is true as well. Consider the statement
S(n+ 1). Then the DM’s payoff at period T − (n+ 1) is V (eT−(n+1)) =
eT−(n+1)eT−(n+2)+δeT−neT−(n+1)+δ 2eT−n−1eT−(n)+ . . .+δ n−1eT eT−1 =
eT−(n+1)eT−(n+2)+δ1eT−(n+1)+δ 21+ . . .+δ n1= eT−(n+1)(eT−(n+2)+δ )+
δ 21 + δ 31 . . .+ δ n−11. Consequently, the DM’s effort is eT−(n+1) = 1,
therefore the statement S(n+ 1) is true. The effort path ∀t > 1 is et = 1.
27
This concludes the proof. 
LEMMA 7: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), e∗1 = 1.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e1) = e1+δe2e1+δ 2e3e2+
. . .+δT−1eT eT−1 = e1+δ1e1+δ 21+ . . .+δT−11= e1(1+δ )+δ 21+ . . .+
δT−11. The DM’s effort at period 1 is e1 = 1. This concludes the proof. 
To summarise these findings, I provide the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k∈{1,T},
e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
This means that when the DM has Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (PIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI),
then irrespective of her time discounting, the DM will exert full effort whether
she has full or no commitment.
2.4 DISCUSSION: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Until now I have assumed that the direct utility is a function of costless effort
that was characterised by constant marginal productivity. However, the results
could be generalised for the case of decreasing marginal productivity of effort
and disutility. Marginal productivity theory is a cornerstone in the analysis of
labor or other factors markets and the input side of short-run production. It
provides insight into the demand for factors of production based on the notion,
for example, that a DM exerts an effort based on a comparison between the
productivity of the effort and the cost of the effort. However, as more of
an effort is exerted, marginal productivity basically declines. It means that
diminishing marginal productivity of efforts affects the optimal effort level
that should be chosen by the DM to maximise her payoff.
Another concept that should be taken in consideration together with
productivity of effort is disutility of effort. In economics it is common to
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assume that exerting effort on a given task is a costly activity that positively
influences the performance on the task to be done. As a result, exerting of
effort induces disutility. The DM will choose an effort so as to maximize
expected utility minus effort disutility. In general, disutility can be considered
as the cost of exerting effort, and can be formalized by assuming that the
agent does not like working, i.e., exerting effort yields disutility, and that
the agent will exert effort on the task only if appropriately motivated and/or
compensated. Disutility of efforts includes the evidence that, for example,
mental tasks require attention effort but people have finite mental processing
speeds. Consequently, exerting effort is costly because working on a specific
activity prevents the agent from paying attention to another one. As a result,
it is important to introduce disutility of effort in my findings.
Now I consider diminishing marginal productivity of effort within each
period. As a result, the direct utility is defined as u(et) = eαt , where α ∈ [0,1).
In the case of ZIEI with IRI, where there is no intertemporal linkage between
periods, it turns out that introducing α ∈ [0,1) does not change the results
at all. The DM still chooses the highest effort level, i.e., 1, in each period
to maximize her utility, regardless of whether she is the social planner or a
decentralized agent.
CLAIM 1: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k=1, k=T, the the
optimal effort path is e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
All proofs of claims are in Appendix 1. Each proof is organised as a set
of proved facts.
The results remain the same even in the presence of intertemporal linkage
between periods. In the case of PIEI and IRI, with α ∈ [0,1), the DM still
chooses the effort level of 1 in each period to maximize her utility regardless
of whether she is a social planner or a decentralized agent.
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CLAIM 2: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k=1, and k=T,
e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
In the case of NIEI and IRI, with α ∈ [0,1), the DM also follows the same
pattern in the presence of intertemporal linkage. She prefers to choose the
highest effort level at the beginning and then the lowest effort level in the
subsequent period, and following this up and down pattern thereafter.
CLAIM 3: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1) for T > 2, the
optimal effort path presents either the combination of {1,0} if T is even, or
the combination of two periods plus one, i.e., {1,0}+{1}, if T is odd. This
effort path e∗ = (1,0,1,0 . . .) dominates any others.
Such a robustness is not observed when I consider the disutility of effort
within each period. Consider the disutility (or cost) of effort C(x) = βeγt ,
where β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1. In the case of ZIEI with IRI, with β > 0 and γ > 1,
the DM will choose the effort level 0 < emax < 1 to maximize her utility.
Suppose the DM tries to maximize the direct utility U(et) = u(et)−C(et),
then the DM will choose the effort level 0 < emax < 1 to maximize her utility.
Thus, the results will remain qualitatively the same.
CLAIM 4: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k=1, k=T, the
optimal effort path is e∗ = (emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax).
The same results can be observed in the case of PIEI and IRI.
CLAIM 5: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k=1, and k=T,
e∗ = (emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax).
The analysis of the case NIEI and IRI with disutility turns out to be
intractable.
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2.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the analysis fully pertains to the Intertemporal Reference
Independence (IRI) case, i.e., without involving any Intertemporal Loss
Aversion or Intertemporal Gain Fondness. I found that the DM behaves the
same way in the ZIEI and PIEI cases by choosing the maximum possible
effort level. In the NIEI case, however, the DM alternates between the highest
possible effort level and zero effort level. It also turns out that these cases
are robust to the inclusion of diminishing marginal productivity of effort.
Although the ZIEI and PIEI cases are robust to the incorporation of disutility
of effort within a period, the NIEI case is not.
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APPENDIX 1: ROBUSTNESS CHECK
Case: Diminishing marginal productivity for IRI
1 The ZIEI Case: u(et) = eαt
Consider the DM who is the social planner, then her expected payoff
over time is Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et) = ∑
T
t=1 δ t−1eαt . As a result, it is
easy to verify that the DM’s payoff is at maximum only if the effort each
period is et = 1, ∀t. Suppose that the DM decides to deviate from this
effort path and her choice is to take et = xt , where xt ∈ [0,1). As a result,
the DM’s payoff is Vδ (et = xt) = xα1 +δx
α
2 + . . .+δ
T−1xαT . Comparing
these two payoffs, I have Vδ (et = 1) > Vδ (et = xt). To summarise, if
the DM is the social planner, her optimal effort at each period is e∗t = 1
∀t and α ∈ [0,1).
Now, assume that the DM is a decentralised agent. Suppose that she
is at period T , then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = eαT . Clearly, eT =
1. Now consider the DM at period T − 1, where her payoff will be
Vδ (eT−1)= eαT−1+δe
α
T = e
α
T−1+δ1
α . Hence, her effort at period T−1
too is eT−1 = 1. Continuing the same logic, the optimal effort path is
e = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
Proof of Claim 1
Claim 1 will be proved through the following facts.
FACT 1: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any t > 1 and δ ∈ (0,1), the
equilibrium effort is e∗t = 1.
Proof The proof invokes an inductive approach. Let e∗ =
(e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an equilibrium. Consider the statement S(n) such
that eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 = 1, . . . ,eT = 1. From this we know that S(0)
and S(1) are true. Suppose that statement S(n) is true as well, that is
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eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 = 1, . . . ,eT = 1. Let’s consider the statement S(n+1).
The DM’s payoff at period T − (n+ 1) is Vδ (eT−(n+1)) = eαT−(n+1)+
δeαT−n + δ
2eαT−n−1 + . . .+ δ
n−1eαT = e
α
T−(n+1) + δ1
α + δ 21α + . . .+
δ n1α . As a result, the effort at period T − (n+ 1) is eT−(n+1) = 1;
therefore, the statement S(n+ 1) is true as well. To summarise, the
effort at each period t > 1 is et = 1. This concludes the proof. 
FACT 2: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for t = 1 and any δ ∈ (0,1), the
optimal effort is e∗1 = 1.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et).
According to Fact 1, we have the Vδ (e) = eα1 + δ1
α + δ 21α + . . .+
δT−11α . As a result, e1 = 1. This concludes the proof. 
This completes the proof of claim. 
2 The PIEI Case: u(et) = et−1eαt
Suppose that the DM is the social planner. Then her expected payoff
over time is Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et) = eα1 + ∑
T
t=2 δ t−1et−1eαt . As a
result, it is easy to verify that the DM’s payoff is at maximum only
if the effort at each period is et = 1, ∀t. Suppose that the DM decides to
deviate from this effort path and her choice is to take et = xt , where
xt ∈ [0,1). Thus, the DM’s payoff is Vδ (et = xt) = xα1 + δx1xα2 +
. . .+ δT−1xT−1xαT . Comparing these two payoffs, I have Vδ (et = 1) >
Vδ (et = xt). To summarise, if the DM is the social planner, then her
optimal effort at each period is e∗t = 1 ∀t.
Now, suppose that the DM is a decentralised agent and she is at period
T . Then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = eαT eT−1. Consequently, the DM’s
effort at period T is eT = 1. Now consider the DM at period T − 1.
Hence, her payoff is Vδ (eT−1) = eαT−1eT−2 + δe
α
T eT−1 = e
α
T−1eT−2 +
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δ1αeT−1. As a result, her effort at period T−1 is eT−1 = 1. Continuing
the same logic, the optimal effort path is e = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
Proof of Claim 2
Claim 2 will be proved through the following facts.
FACT 3: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T and t > 1,
e∗t = 1.
Proof The proof invokes an inductive approach. Let e∗ =
(e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an optimal solution. Consider the statement
S(n) such that eT−n = 1,eT−n−1 = 1, . . . ,eT = 1. We infer
that S(0) and S(1) are true. Suppose that the statement
S(n) is true as well. Let’s consider the statement S(n + 1).
Then the DM’s payoff at period T − (n + 1) is V (T − (n +
1)) = eαT−(n+1)eT−(n+2) + δe
α
T−neT−(n+1) + δ
2eαT−n−1eT−(n) + . . . +
δ n−1eαT eT−1 = e
α
T−(n+1)eT−(n+2)+ δ1
αeT−(n+1)+ δ 21α + . . .+ δ n1α .
Consequently, the DM chooses the effort level eT−(n+1) = 1, therefore
the statement S(n+ 1) is true. Thus, the effort path ∀t > 1 is et = 1.
This concludes the proof. 
FACT 4: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), e∗1 = 1.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e1) = eα1 + δe
α
2 e1 +
δ 2eα3 e2 + . . . + δ
T−1eαT eT−1 = e
α
1 + δ1
αe1 + δ 21α + . . . + δT−11α .
Hence, e1 = 1. The DM chooses the effort level e1 to be 1. This
concludes the proof. 
This completes the proof of claim. 
3 The NIEI Case: u(et) = (1− et−1)eαt
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The direct utility is u(et) = (1− et−1)eαt , where α ∈ [0,1). The
DM’s expected payoff is Vδ (e) =∑Tt=1 δ t−1u(et) = eα1 +∑
T
t=2 δ t−1(1−
et−1)eαt .
Proof of Claim 3
Claim 3 will be proved through the following facts.
FACT 5: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), if T is even
and T > 2, the effort path represents the combination of {1,0}.
Proof If T is even, it can be considered a combination of two-period
strings. For now suppose that T = 4. Therefore it consists of a
combination of two two-period strings. The DM’s payoff is V =
eα1 + δe
α
2 (1− e1) + δ 2eα3 (1− e2) + δ 3eα4 (1− e3). Hence, if δ < 1,
the effort will be e1 = 1. Then in the next period, the fatigue state
is 1− e1 = 1− 1 = 0, and regardless of her effort in the second
period, her utility in that period is 0. The fatigue state at period 3 is
1− e2 = 1− 0 = 1. Therefore, the DM’s choice at period 3 is e3 = 1.
Consequently, in the next period, the DM encounters the fatigue state
1−e3 = 1−1= 0, and the choice of level of effort by the DM is e4 = 0.
Now suppose that the DM wants to deviate and choose another effort
xt at period t, i.e., et = xt , where xt ∈ (0,1). Hence, her payoff is
Vδ (x1,x2,x3,x4) = xα1 + δx
α
2 (1− x1) + δ 2xα3 (1− x2) + δ 3xα4 (1− x3).
Compare this payoff to V (1,0,1,0) = 1α + δ0+ δ 21α + δ 30. Then
we have V (1,0,1,0) > Vδ (x1,x2,x3,x4). Consequently, a combination
of two-period strings {1,0} dominates any others. This concludes the
proof. 
FACT 6: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1) if T is odd,
the effort path represents the combination of two periods plus one, i.e.,
{1,0}+{1}.
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Proof Suppose T is odd. Then we can consider a combination of
two-period strings plus one-period. According to Fact 5, the two-period
strings are {1,0}. Now suppose T = 3. Then it consists of a
combination of two-period strings plus one-period. The DM’s payoff
is V = eα1 + δe
α
2 (1− e1)+ δ 2eα3 (1− e2). Hence, if δ < 1, the effort
e1 = 1. Then in the next period, the fatigue state is 1− e1 = 1−1 = 0,
and regardless of her effort in the second period, her utility in that period
will be 0. The fatigue state at period 3 is 1−e2 = 1−0 = 1. Therefore,
the DM’s choice at period 3 will be e3 = 1.
Now suppose that the DM wants to deviate and take another effort
xt at period t, that is et = xt , where xt ∈ (0,1). Hence, her payoff
is Vδ (x1,x2,x3) = xα1 + δx
α
2 (1− x1) + δ 2xα3 (1− x2). Compare this
payoff to V (1,0,1) = 1α + δ0+ δ 21α . Then we have V (1,0,1) >
Vδ (x1,x2,x3). Consequently, a combination of two-period strings {1,0}
plus one-period {1} will dominate any other path. This concludes the
proof. 
FACT 7: In the case of NIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), the effort path
e∗=(1,0,1,0 . . .) dominates any others such as e∗∗=(x1,x2,x3,x4, . . .),
∀xt ∈ [0,1).
Proof The DM’s payoff from the effort path e∗ = (1,0,1,0, . . .) is
V (1,0,1,0, . . .) = 1α + δ0+ δ 21α + δ 30+ . . .. The DM’s payoff from
the effort path e∗∗ = (x,y,z,w, . . .) is V (x,y,z,w, . . .) = xα + δyα(1−
x)+δ 2zα(1− y)+δ 3wα(1− y)+ . . .
Comparing these two payoffs, we have V (1,0,1,0, . . .) −
V (x,y,z,w, . . .) = 1α + δ0 + δ 21α + δ 30 + . . . − [xα + δyα(1 −
x)+ δ 2zα(1− y)+ δ 3wα(1− y)+ . . .] > 0. Hence, e∗ = (1,0,1,0, . . .)
dominates any other effort path. This concludes the proof. 
This completes the proof of claim. 
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Case: Disutility
1 The ZIEI and IRI Case
Consider the DM who is the social planner. Then her expected payoff is
Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1U(et). Then, it is easy to verify that the DM’s payoff
is at maximum only if her effort at each period is et = e∗, ∀t.
Now, assume that the DM is a decentralised DM. Suppose that she
is at period T , then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = U(eT ). Clearly,
eT = emax. Next, consider the DM at period T − 1, where her payoff
is Vδ (eT−1) =U(eT−1)+ δU(emax). Hence, her effort at period T − 1
too is eT−1 = emax. Continuing the same logic, the optimal effort path
is e = (emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax).
Proof of Claim 4
Claim 4 will be proved through the following facts.
FACT 8: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for any t > 1 and δ ∈ (0,1), the
equilibrium effort is e∗t = emax.
Proof The proof invokes an inductive approach. Let e∗ =
(e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an equilibrium path. Consider the statement S(n)
such that eT−n = e∗,eT−n−1 = e∗, . . . ,eT = emax. We infer that S(0)
and S(1) are true. Suppose the statement S(n) is true as well, that is
eT−n = e∗,eT−n−1 = e∗, . . . ,eT = emax. Let’s consider the statement
S(n + 1). The DM’s payoff at period T − (n + 1) is Vδ (T − (n +
1)) = U(eT−(n+1))+ δU(eT−n)+ δ 2U(eT−n−1)+ . . .+ δ n−1U(eT ) =
U(eT−(n+1)) + δU(e∗) + δ 2U(e∗) + . . .+ δ nU(e∗). As a result, the
effort at the period T − (n + 1) is eT−(n+1) = emax, therefore, the
statement S(n+ 1) is true as well. To summarise, the effort at each
period t > 1 is et = emax. This concludes the proof. 
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FACT 9: In the case of ZIEI and IRI, for t = 1 and any δ ∈ (0,1), the
equilibrium effort is e∗1 = emax.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e) =∑Tt=1 δ t−1U(et) =
U(e1)+ δU(e∗)+ δ 2U(e∗)+ . . .+ δT−1U(e∗). According to Fact 8,
we have Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1U(et) =U(e1)+ δU(emax)+ δ 2U(emax)+
. . .+δT−1U(emax). Thus, e1 = emax. This concludes the proof. 
This completes the proof of claim. 
2 The PIEI and IRI Case
Suppose that the DM is a social planner. Then her expected payoff
is Vδ (e) = ∑Tt=1 δ t−1U(et). Hence, it is easy to verify that the DM’s
payoff is at maximum only if the effort at each period is et = emax,
∀t. Suppose that the DM decides to deviate from this effort path and
her choice is et = xt , where xt ∈ [0,emax). Thus, the DM’s payoff is
Vδ (et = xt)=U(x1)+δU(x2)+ . . .+δT−1U(xT ).Comparing these two
payoffs, I have Vδ (et = emax) > Vδ (et = xt). To summarise, if the DM
is a social planner, then her optimal effort at each period is e∗t = emax
∀t.
Now, suppose that the DM is a decentralised agent and she is at
period T . Then the DM’s payoff is V (eT ) = U(eT ). Consequently,
the DM’s effort at period T is eT = emax. Now, consider the DM at
period T − 1. Hence, her payoff is Vδ (eT−1) = U(eT−1)+ δU(eT ) =
U(eT−1)+ δU(emax). Hence, her effort at T − 1 will be eT−1 = emax.
Continuing the same logic, the equilibrium effort path will be e =
(emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax).
Proof of Claim 5
Claim 5 will be proved through the following facts.
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FACT 10: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), T and t > 1,
e∗t = emax.
Proof We will invoke an inductive approach. Let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T )
be an equilibrium. Consider the statement S(n) such that eT−n =
emax,eT−n−1 = emax, . . . ,eT = emax. We infer that S(0) and S(1) are
true. Suppose that the statement S(n) is true as well. Let’s consider
the statement S(n+ 1). The DM’s payoff at period T − (n+ 1) is
V (T − (n + 1)) = U(eT−(n+1)) + δU(eT−n) + δ 2U(eT−n−1) + . . . +
δ n−1U(eT ) =U(eT−(n+1))+δU(emax)+δ 2U(emax)+ . . .+δ nU(emax).
Consequently, the effort is eT−(n+1) = emax. Therefore, the statement
S(n+1) is true. Thus, the effort ∀t > 1 is et = emax. This concludes the
proof. 
FACT 11: In the case of PIEI and IRI, for any δ ∈ (0,1), e∗1 = emax.
Proof Consider the DM’s payoff at period 1, Vδ (e1) =U(e1)+δ (e2)+
δ 2U(e3)+ . . .+ δT−1U(eT ) =U(e1)+ δU(emax)+ δ 2U(emax)+ . . .+
δT−1U(emax). Hence, e1 = emax. This ends the proof. 
This completes the proof of claim. 
3 The NIEI and IRI Case
The analysis of the case for NIEI and IRI with disutility is intractable.
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3. CHAPTER
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I consider a DM who has Intertemporal Reference dependence
(IRD), i.e., the DM will compare her consecutive outcomes in adjacent
periods, and thus, apart from her standard direct utility from the outcome
of her choice of effort in each period, the DM can also get a reference payoff
gain from an increase in the outcome and/or suffer a reference payoff loss
from a decrease in the outcome - unless her outcomes are exactly the same in
consecutive periods. Specifically, the gain-fondness coefficient λ+ ≥ 0 of the
DM determines the extent of the reference utility increase she will experience
from her intertemporal outcome increment. Likewise the DM experiences
a reference utility decrease from any loss, i.e., any decline in her outcome
compared to last period. In that case, her loss-aversion coefficient λ− ≥ 0
determines the extent of the reference utility decrease she will experience
from that intertemporal outcome drop.
I extend my analysis of the case of ZIEI (Zero Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence) with λ− > 0 and/or λ+ > 0. I first consider the
finite-horizon case with λ− > λ+, which is the typical case considered in
the reference-dependence literature. In this setup, the DM behaves like a
standard DM (as in the ZIEI and IRI case) when λ+ is relatively low in that
she chooses the highest possible effort level for every period. However, when
λ+ is relatively high and she does not discount the future much, the DM
starts with a low level of effort (and thus a low level of outcome) at t = 1, but
behaves just like a standard DM thereafter, by picking the highest effort level
for every period from then on. I show that this behaviour of the DM is robust
to full commitment, and thus it coincides with a social planner’s optimal plan.
I then consider the case λ+> λ−. My results turn out to be the same as the
λ+ ≤ λ− case whenever λ+ does not exceed λ− by much. When λ+ exceeds
λ− significantly, however, a much richer dynamic may arise, and fluctuating
or volatile effort levels and thus outcome levels can become standard under
some parameters: the DM may even prefer first taking a loss so that she can
then enjoy a gain later when λ+ > λ− and her discounting is strong. Further
she may prefer following this up-and-down pattern throughout, as long as she
finishes with the highest possible effort and outcome. However, in this case
the DM’s behaviour is no longer robust to full commitment, and it does not
coincide with a social planner’s optimal path any longer. Finally, I also show
that incorporating disutility of effort does not affect the outcome qualitatively.
Neither does any diminishing marginal productivity of effort.
3.2 MODEL
In this chapter too I will follow the same definitions and notations from
Chapter 2. Briefly, here too I consider the DM who takes part in the finite
dynamic task, where time is discrete and T < ∞. In each period t = 1, . . . ,T ,
the DM has to take a costless effort et ∈ [0,1] that yields a direct utility
of u(et) > 0 in period t with certainty. The DM’s period t ≥ 2 utility
from the effort path e = (e1, . . . ,eT ) is vt(e) = u(et) + λ+(u(et)− u(et−1))
if u(et)> u(et−1) and vt(e) = u(et)−λ−(u(et−1)−u(et)) if u(et)< u(et−1),
where λ+(u(et)−u(et−1)) is a reference utility gain, and λ−(u(et−1)−u(et))
is a reference utility loss. The DM chooses e ∈ [0,1]T to maximise her
discounted sum of utility given by
Vδ (e) = u(e1)+
T
∑
t=2
δ t−1vt(e), (3.1)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is her time discount factor.
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3.3 INTERTEMPORAL REFERENCE DEPENDENCE: λ− > 0
AND/OR λ+ > 0
3.3.1 THE ZIEI CASE WITH A λ−-DOMINANT DM
Here, I will study the Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (ZIEI)
(i.e., u(et) = et) with λ+ < λ−. The following Proposition 4 summarizes the
main findings of this section.
(
For proofs of lemmas, claims and propositions,
see Appendix 1, unless stated otherwise.
)
PROPOSITION 4: For any δ ∈ (0,1), λ+ < λ− and T , e∗ is an optimal path
if and only if e∗ is fully commitment proof where e∗t = 1 for all t > 1 while
e1 = 1 if λ+ < 1δ and e1 = 0 otherwise.
Thus, Proposition 4 states that if λ+δ < 1, i.e., both the gain-fondness
coefficient and her discount factor are relatively small, the DM will behave
just like the DM in the ZIEI and IRI case choosing an effort path of
(1,1,1, ...,1,1) or one with a slightly different beginning (0,1,1, ...,1,1). If
both λ+ and δ are less than one, then (1,1,1, ...,1,1) will take place.
If, however, λ+δ > 1, (i.e., λ+> 1δ or δ >
1
λ+ ), then our DM will exhibit a
big increase in her effort initially and then follow up with the maximum effort
afterwards. This requires that both λ+ and δ are substantial. A low δ would
prevent the DM from doing so since obtaining a 0 payoff at period 1 would be
unacceptable for such a DM; likewise, a low λ+ would not induce the DM to
experience such an gain or improvement at the expense of a 0 payoff at period
1.
Proposition 4 will be proved through the following lemmas and
propositions.
LEMMA 8: For both k=1 and k=T, e∗T = 1.
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LEMMA 9: Suppose k = T . There exists an optimal solution such that for
each t ≥ 2, we have e∗t = 1.
While Lemma 9 allows us to clearly show that if the equilibrium set is
non-empty, then there is an equilibrium such that the DM provides the effort
level 1 in each of the last T −1 periods. I can use Lemma 9 to prove that the
equilibrium set is non-empty. In what follows, I will provide a more direct
approach and show that the above-mentioned equilibrium is unique. In that
result too, I will keep assuming that k = T . But before that, I will give an
indication of the direction I will take by showing that for any t > 1 it cannot
be that et+1 > 0.
LEMMA 10: For k=1 and k=T, no optimal effort path can have a period t > 1
such that et+1 = 0.
This Lemma 10 states that when the DM has Zero Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (ZIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with
λ− > λ+, then the DM never chooses the lowest possible effort in any
subsequent period.
LEMMA 11: Suppose k = T . Then in any equilibrium, the following must be
true: there exists 0 < x≤ 1 such that e2 = . . .= eT−1 = x≤ 1= eT and e1 = x
if δ < 1λ+ and e1 = 0 otherwise.
LEMMA 12: Suppose k = T . Then the effort path ex = (0,x,x, . . . ,1) is
strictly dominated by e1 and the effort path e′x = (x,x,x, . . . ,1) is strictly
dominated by e′1.
This means that when the DM has Zero Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (ZIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with
λ− > λ+, then if the coefficient of gain-fondness is relatively low, the effort
path (where the DM chooses the highest possible effort at each period) strictly
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dominates any other effort paths. If the coefficient of gain fondness is
relatively high and the DM does not discount the future much, the effort path
(where the DM starts with the lowest level of effort at the first period, but
behaves just like a standard DM thereafter by picking the highest effort level
at every period) strictly dominates any other effort paths as well.
LEMMA 13: The optimal effort path with k= 1 is identical to that with k= T .
This completes the proof of the Proposition 4. 
As mentioned above again, if the DM was a standard utility person as in
the ZIEI and IRI case, she would choose the effort ‘1’ in each of the T periods.
The above analysis then yields the following interesting proposition (and thus
the proof will be skipped).
PROPOSITION 5: For k=1 and k=T, the efforts of a standard utility
maximizing DM are identical to a loss-averse/gain-fond utility maximizing
DM irrespective of the value of λ− that exceeds λ+ but if and only if
λ+ < 1δ .
The above analysis yields a “Boolean” world in the effort space as the
DM essentially remains fully active except in the initial period where she
may either be fully active or fully inactive.
3.3.2 THE ZIEI CASE WITH A λ+-DOMINANT DM
Now, I will study the ZIEI case where λ+ ≥ λ−, i.e., the DM has a higher
gain-fondness coefficient than her loss-aversion coefficient. In the above
section with λ+ < λ−, the DM would never choose an effort that leads to
an intertemporal loss when λ− > λ+. However, as I will show, this need not
hold with λ+≥ λ− (although it can still continue to hold when λ+≥ λ− with
λ+ and λ− being very close).
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In a case of a λ+-dominant DM, she may prefer first taking a loss so
that she can then enjoy a gain when λ+ ≥ λ− and her discounting is strong.
Further, she may prefer following this up-and-down pattern throughout, as
long as she finishes everything on a good note, i.e., with an effort level eT = 1.
The following facts will be useful. I will need the following definition:
DEFINITION 10: (Prior) Effort history ht−1 for period t is defined as an effort
that was exerted by the DM in period t−1.1
FACT 12: For any δ ∈ (0,1), T , k=1, k=T, and λ+ ≥ λ−, eT = 1.
Proof Suppose the DM is at period T . Then eT = 1 regardless of λ+ ≥ λ−.
To see this let us fix any immediate effort history hT−1 = eT−1 ∈ [0,1] for
period T . Then given u(·) is monotonic increasing, it cannot be that eT <
hT−1. Given that, it also follows that eT takes its maximum value on [0,1],
i.e., eT = 1. As this argument does not use commitment power, the result
follows.
FACT 13: For T = 2, the effort path is (1,1) if δ < 1λ+ ; or (0,1) otherwise for
any δ and k.
Proof Suppose that T = 2. The last period effort is eT = 1. The DM payoff
from e1 is u(e1) + δ (1+ λ+(1− u(e1)). Then C(e1)) = 1− δλ+.2 This
implies that if C(e1) = 1− δλ+ > 0 then e1 = 1, otherwise e1 = 0. This
proves Fact 13.
In the next section I will first proceed with examples.
3.3.3 EXAMPLE WITH T = 3 AND T = 4
Here, I will provide only outcomes of the cases T = 3 and T = 4. For details
of these examples, see Appendices 2 and 3. These examples provide a wide
1 This definition will be useful in proofs
2 I use this notation C(et) throughout this chapter whenever I need to analyse the
coefficient of u(et) in Vδ (e).
45
spectrum of all possible effort paths that the DM can follow. Moreover,
these examples demonstrate that regardless of k = 1 or k = T , the effort path
depends on the relation between λ+ and λ−.
For T = 3, I have:
When λ+< λ−(1+λ−), the optimal effort path is e∗= (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+
and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ .
If δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the optimal effort path is e
∗ = (0,1,1).
When λ+ > λ−(1+λ−), however, the DM’s optimal effort path could be
e∗ = (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ ;
e∗ = (0,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ;
and e∗ = (1,0,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
Next, I introduce outcomes for the example of T = 4. This example is also
important because it provides effort paths different from those in the case of
T = 3.
When λ+ < λ−(1+λ−), the equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if
δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ .
If δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ the optimal effort path is e
∗ = (0,1,1,1).
If δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ the optimal effort path is e
∗ = (0,1,0,1).
When λ+ > λ−(1+λ−), however, the DM’s optimal effort path could be
e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ;
e∗ = (0,1,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ;
e∗ = (1,0,1,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ ;
and e∗ = (0,1,0,1) δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
Based on examples for T = 3 and T = 4, the following Claim 6 is
immediate:
CLAIM 6: For λ+ ≥ λ−, T = 3 and T = 4 the optimal effort path is
determined by the relation between δ and λ+ and λ−(1+λ−) and T .
The above Claim 6 is a short-cut of the following:
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(i) If λ+ < λ−(1+λ−):
e∗ =

(1,1,1,{1}), if δ < 1λ+
(0,1,1,{1}), if) δ > 1λ+ and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,1,0,{1}), if δ > 1+λ−λ+
(ii) if λ+ > λ−(1+λ−):
e∗ =

(1,1,1,{1}), if δ < 1λ+
(0,1,1,{1}), if) δ > 1λ+ and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+
(1,0,1,{1}), if δ < 1λ− and δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,1,0,{1}), if δ > 1λ+ and δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
 
 
𝜆𝜆−(1 + 𝜆𝜆−) < 𝜆𝜆+ 
 
                                          1,1,1,1            0,1,1,1                                 0,1,0,1 
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𝝀𝝀+
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−
𝝀𝝀+
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𝝀𝝀−
                                     1 
 
 
𝜆𝜆−(1 + 𝜆𝜆−) > 𝜆𝜆+ 
 
1,1,1,1          0,1,1,1                        1,0,1,1                   0,1,0,1 
 
                                     0                𝟏𝟏
𝝀𝝀+
                          𝟏𝟏
𝝀𝝀−
                         𝟏𝟏+𝝀𝝀
−
𝝀𝝀+
                                              1                                   
 
Now, I provide the general result in the case of T periods. The DM’s
optimal effort path is given by the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 6: For λ+ > λ− the equilibrium effort path is:
e= (1,1, . . . ,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ , ;
e= (0,1,1, . . . ,1,1) if 1+λ
−
λ+ > δ >
1
λ+ ;
Or there is e= (0,1,0,1, . . . ,0,1) if 1+λ
−
λ+ < δ .
When the DM has Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (ZIEI)
and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with λ+ > λ− (i.e., "λ+
- dominant" case), then the DM may even prefer taking a loss so that she
can then enjoy a gain later. Further, the DM may prefer following this
up-and-down pattern throughout, as long as she finishes with the highest
possible effort and outcome.
See Appendix 1 for the proof.
3.4 DISCUSSION: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this chapter too, until now, I have considered the direct utility which
is a function of costless effort that was characterised by constant marginal
productivity. Now I will consider diminishing marginal productivity of
effort within each period. As a result, the direct utility is determined as
u(et) = eαt , where α ∈ [0,1). In the case of ZIEI and IRD, where there
exists intertemporal linkage between periods in terms involving intertemporal
loss aversion or intertemporal gain fondness, it turns out that introducing
α ∈ [0,1) does not change the results at all in both cases:λ−-dominant DM or
λ+ -dominant DM.
In the case of ZIEI and λ− - dominant DM the following claim describes
the effort path:
CLAIM 7: In the case of ZIEI and a λ− - dominant DM, for any δ ∈ (0,1),
λ+ < λ− and T , e∗ is an optimal path if and only if e∗ is fully commitment
proof where e∗t = 1 for all t > 1 while e1 = 1 if λ+ < 1δ and e1 = 0 otherwise.
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The proof of claim mimics the related proofs in Chapter 2; therefore I
omit it here.
In the case of ZIEI and a λ+ - dominant DM, the following claim describes
the effort path under the condition of diminishing marginal productivity of
effort:
CLAIM 8: For λ+ ≥ λ− the optimal effort path is:
If δ < 1λ+ , e = (1,1, . . . ,1,1);
If 1+λ
−
λ+ > δ >
1
λ+ , e = (0,1,1, . . . ,1,1);
Or there is e = (0,1,0,1, . . . ,0,1) if 1+λ
−
λ+ < δ .
Again, the proof of claim mimics the related proofs in Chapter 2; therefore
I omit it here.
Such a robustness is not observed when I consider disutility of effort
within each period. Consider the disutility (or cost) of effort C(x) = βeγt ,
where β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1. In the case of ZIEI with IRD, with β > 0 and γ > 1,
the DM will choose the effort level 0 < emax < 1 to maximize her utility.
Suppose the DM tries to maximize the direct utility U(et) = u(et)−C(et),
then the DM will choose the effort level 0 < emax < 1 to maximize her utility.
Thus, the results will remain qualitatively the same. To prove it, I replace
u(et) by Ut in the case of ZIEI and λ−-dominance and in the case of ZIEI and
λ+- dominance to obtain the following claims.
CLAIM 9: In the case of ZIEI and a λ− - dominant DM, for any δ ∈ (0,1),
λ+ < λ− and T , e∗ is an optimal path if and only if e∗ is fully commitment
proof where e∗t = emax for all t > 1 while e1 = emax if λ+ < 1δ and e1 = 0
otherwise.
Again, as the proof of claim mimics the related proofs in Chapter 2, I omit
it here.
CLAIM 10: For λ+ ≥ λ− the equilibrium effort path is:
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If δ < 1λ+ , e = (emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax);
If 1+λ
−
λ+ > δ >
1
λ+ , e = (0,emax,emax, . . . ,emax,emax);
Or there is e = (0,emax,0,emax, . . . ,0,emax) if 1+λ
−
λ+ < δ .
Likewise, as the proof of claim mimics the related proofs in Chapter 2, I
omit it here.
3.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I analyse the Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) case,
i.e., the case that involves Intertemporal Loss Aversion or Intertemporal Gain
Fondness. Unlike Chapter 2, in this chapter the DM compares her consecutive
outcomes in adjacent periods, and thus, her payoff at each period gets either a
gain due to an increase in her output or a payoff loss due to an decrease in her
outcome, unless her outcomes are exactly the same in consecutive periods.
I found that in the framework of “λ− - dominance”the DM will behave
just like the DM in the ZIEI and IRI case choosing an effort path of
(1,1,1, ...,1,1) or another effort path which has a slightly different beginning
(0,1,1, ...,1,1). This behaviour is robust to full or no commitment, and thus
it also coincides with a social planner’s optimal plan. It is also robust to
diminishing marginal productivity of effort and disutility of effort.
In the case of “λ+ -dominance”, when λ+ does not exceed λ− by much,
the DM behaves just like the way she did in the λ− - dominant case. In the
case where λ+ exceeds λ− significantly, however, the DM exhibits different
effort paths even with an up-and-down pattern throughout, as long as she
finishes with an effort level eT = 1. It is robust to diminishing marginal
productivity of effort and disutility of effort.
Thus, overall, when the DM moves from the ZIEI and IRI case to the ZIEI
and IRD case, whether or not λ− > λ+ starts mattering a lot. The DM with
λ− > λ+ still behaves very much like the DM with λ− = λ+ = 0, while the
50
DM with λ− ≤ λ+ may start behaving very differently especially as λ− and
λ+ diverge.
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APPENDIX 1: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 8
Let us fix any immediate history hT−1 ∈ [0,1] for period T . Then, given
u(·) is monotonic increasing, it cannot be that eT < hT−1. Given that, it also
follows that eT takes its maximum value on [0,1]. As this argument does not
use commitment power. Lemma 8 has been proved. 
Proof of Lemma 9
The proof will involve an induction argument and invoke the
One-Step-Deviation Principle (OSDP). Let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an
equilibrium and consider the statement S(n),T −1≥ n≥ 0 that
e∗T−n = e
∗
T−(n−1), . . . ,e
∗
T−1,e
∗
T = 1.
From Lemma 4 we know that e∗T = 1 and hence S(0) is true. So consider S(1)
and note that to prove it is true, OSDP ensures that blocking any deviation at
period T − 1 will suffice. So given e∗, the utility of the DM from e∗ (given
S(1) holds) is
Vδ (e
∗|S(1)) = u(e∗1)+
T−2
∑
t=2
δ t−1vt(e∗|S(1))+
+δT−2[1+λ+(1−u(e∗T−2))]+δT−1.
Suppose the DM considers a OSD to alter her original plan at period T − 1
and let that choice be x ∈ [0,1). We need to consider two cases separately.
First assume x≤ e∗T−2. In this case, her utility is
Vδ (e
∗|x) = u(e∗1)+
T−2
∑
t=2
δ t−1vt(e∗|S(1))+δT−2[u(x)−λ−(u(e∗T−2)−u(x))]+
+δT−1[1+λ+(1−u(x))].
Let C(x) be the coefficient of u(x) in Vδ (e∗|x). Then
C(x) = δT−2u(x)[1+λ−−δλ+]> 0.
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Hence, x = e∗T−2.
Next assume x≥ e∗T−2. In this case, her utility is
Vδ (e
∗|x) = u(e∗1)+
T−2
∑
t=2
δ t−1vt(e∗|S(1))+δT−2[u(x)+λ+(u(x)−u(e∗T−2))]+
+δT−1[1+λ+(1−u(x))].
Here,
C(x) = δT−2u(x)[1+λ+−δλ+]> 0.
Hence, x = 1. We next show that Vδ (e∗|x = 1) > Vδ (e∗|e∗T−2) for each e∗.
Observe that
Vδ (e
∗|x = 1)−Vδ (e∗|e∗T−2) = (1−u(e∗T−2))[1+λ+(1−δ )]> 0
whenever e∗T−2 < 1. If e
∗
T−2 = 1 then the result is trivially true. Hence we have
shown that S(1) is true. So now assume S(n) is true and check S(n+1). But
OSDP and the proof above for S(1) render this argument in a straightforward
way. So see this, suppose S(n) is true. This means irrespective of e∗n−1, it
must be that e∗n = e∗n+1 = . . .e
∗
T = 1. From the proof for S(1), we know that
irrespective of the value of e∗n−2, it must be that e
∗
n−1 = 1. Hence S(n+1) is
true. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 10
Assume k = T . Pick any arbitrary t ∈ {2, . . . ,T −1} and consider the path
e(et ,et+1) = (e1, . . . ,et−1,et ,et+1,et+2, . . . ,eT−1,1).
Let
V jδ (e(et ,et+1)) :=
T
∑
i= j
δ i− jv(e(et ,et+1)).
Then,
V tδ (e(1,1)) := 1+λ
+[1−u(et−1)]+δ +δ 2[u(et+2)−λ−(1−u(et+2))]+
+δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)),
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V tδ (e(1,0)) := 1+λ
+[1−u(et−1)]−δλ−+δ 2[u(et+2)+λ+u(et+2)]+
+δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)),
and
V tδ (e(0,0)) :=−λ−[u(et−1)]+δ 2[u(et+2)+λ+u(et+2)]+δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)).
It is easy to verify that V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1 = 1) ≤ V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1) for all et−1 ∈
[0,1]. Now, V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1 = 1)>V tδ (e(1,0)) if and only if 1+λ−−δλ− >
δ (λ+− λ−)u(et+2). With λ− > λ+, the RHS is negative while the LHS
is positive. Hence V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1 = 1) > V tδ (e(1,0)) for all effort paths.
Also, V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1 = 1)>V tδ (e(0,0)) if and only if 1+δ +λ−(1−δ 2)>
δ 2(λ+−λ−)u(et+2). With λ− > λ+. Again the RHS is negative while the
LHS is positive. Hence V tδ (e(1,1)|et−1 = 1)>V tδ (e(0,0)) for all effort paths.
Put together we have have proved the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 11.
Consider an arbitrary equilibrium effort path e = e1,e2,e3, . . . ,eT ,
assuming an equilibrium exists. We will first show that e1 ∈ {0,e2}. Given e,
we consider two cases. In the first, we assume that e1 ≤ e2. Then
Vδ (e) = u(e1)+δ [u(e2)+λ+(u(e2)−u(e1))]+δ 2V≥3δ
where V≥3δ = ∑
T
t=3 δ t−3vt(·). Then by OSDP it suffices to optimize w.r.t. e1
to see the best choice in period 1. Here C(e1) = 1− δλ+. Hence, e1 = 0 if
δ > 1λ+ and e1 = e2 if δ <
1
λ+ .
Similarly, if e1 ≥ e2. then
Vδ (e) = u(e1)+δ [u(e2)−λ−(u(e1)−u(e2))]+δ 2V≥3δ
where V≥3δ is as before. Then by OSDP it again suffices to optimize w.r.t.
e1 to see the best choice in period 1. Here C(e1) = 1− δλ−. Hence,
e1 = e2 if δ > 1λ− and e1 = 1 if δ <
1
λ− . Given λ
+ < λ−, there are a
maximum of three cases to consider. First, suppose δ > 1λ+ . By choosing
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the effort e2 the DM’s payoff is u(e2) + δu(e2) + δ 2V≥3δ while from effort
0 it is δ [u(e2)+λ+u(e2)]+ δ 2V≥3δ . Since δ >
1
λ+ , it follows that the effort
0 strictly dominates e2. Next suppose δ < 1λ− . By taking the effort 1 the
DM’s payoff is 1+δ [u(e2)−λ−(1−u(e2))]+δ 2V≥3δ while from effort e2 it
is u(e2)+δu(e2)+δ 2V≥3δ . Since δ <
1
λ− , it follows that the effort 1 strictly
dominates e2. Finally if 1λ− < δ <
1
λ+ the effort is always e2.
Now we pin down e2 in relation to e3.
• Case δ > 1λ+ :
– 0 ≤ e2 ≤ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is δ [u(e2)+ λ+u(e2)] +
δ 2[u(e3)+λ+(u(e3)−u(e2))]. ThenC(e2)= δ (1+λ+−δλ+)>
0. This means e2 = e3.
– 0 ≤ e2 ≥ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is δ [u(e2)+ λ+u(e2)] +
δ 2[u(e3)−λ−(u(e2)−u(e3))]. Then C(e2) = δ (1+λ+−δλ−).
If C(e2)> 0, we have e2 = 1. If C(e2)< 0, then e2 = e3.
– There exists x,y ∈ [0,1] such that
(e1,e2,e3) ∈ {(0,x,x),(0,1,y)}.
• Case 1λ− < δ < 1λ+ :
– e2 ≤ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is u(e2)+δu(e2)+δ 2[u(e3)+
λ+(u(e3)− u(e2))]. Then C(e2) = 1+ δ − δ 2λ+ > 0 since δ <
1
λ+ . This means e2 = e3.
– e2 ≥ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is u(e2)+δu(e2)+δ 2[u(e3)−
λ−(u(e2)−u(e3))]. ThenC(e2) = 1+δ−δ 2λ−. So ifC(e2)> 0,
then we have e2 = e3. If C(e2)< 0, then e2 = 0.
– There exists x ∈ [0,1] such that (e1,e2,e3) = (x,x,x).
• Case 1λ− > δ :
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– e2 ≤ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is 1 + δ [u(e2)− λ−(1−
u(e2))] + δ 2[u(e3) + λ+(u(e3)− u(e2))]. Then C(e2) = δ (1+
λ−−δλ+)> 0 since δ < 1λ− . This means e2 = e3.
– e2 ≥ e3: The DM’s payoff from e2 is 1 + δ [u(e2)− λ−(1−
u(e2))] + δ 2[u(e3)− λ−(u(e2)− u(e3))]. Then C(e2) = δ (1+
λ−−δλ−)> 0 since δ < 1λ− . This means e2 = e3.
– There exists y ∈ [0,1] such that (e1,e2,e3) = (1,y,y).
CLAIM 11: (e1,e2,e3) = (0,1,y) if and only if y = 1.
To see this for any effort path with (e1,e2,e3) = (0,1,y), the payoff of the DM
with e4 ≥ y is
δ [1+λ+]+δ 2[u(y)−λ−(1−u(y))]+δ 3[u(e4)+λ+(u(e4)−u(y))]+ . . . .
Then, C(y) = δ 2[1+ λ−− δλ+] > 0. Hence y = 1. On the other hand if
e4 ≤ y then the payoff is
δ [1+λ+]+δ 2[u(y)−λ−(1−u(y))]+δ 3[u(e4)−λ−(u(y)−u(e4))]+ . . . .
Then, C(y) = δ 2[1+λ−−δλ−]> 0. Hence y = 1.
CLAIM 12: (e1,e2,e3) = (1,y,y) if and only if y = 1.
To see this, given any effort path with (e1,e2,e3) = (1,y,y), the payoff of the
DM with e4 ≥ y is
1+δ (u(y)−λ−(1−u(y)))+δ 2u(y)+δ 3[u(e4)+λ+(u(e4)−u(y))]+ . . . .
Then C(y) = δ [1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+]> 0. Hence y = 1. If e4 ≤ y is
1+δ (u(y)−λ−(1−u(y)))+δ 2u(y)+δ 3[u(e4)−λ−(u(y)−u(e4))]+ . . . .
Then C(y) = δ [1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ−]> 0. Hence y = 1.
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So we know that any effort path must respect the following:
(e1,e2,e3) ∈ {(0,x,x),(x,x,x)}.
Now we show that then e4 = x. To see this consider the path
x,x,x,e4,e5, . . . ,1. We have shown that irrespective of e4, the path should
start x,x,x. Now consider the choice of e4. This is equivalent to choosing e4
at e1,x,x,e4,e5, . . . ,1. Hence the two problems are equivalent. Now suppose
the path is 0,x,x,e4,e5, . . . ,1 and consider the choice of e4. This is equivalent
to choosing e4 at e1,x,x,e4,e5, . . . ,1. Hence the two problems are equivalent
again.
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 12.
Given Lemma 4, we know that in any equilibrium we have eT = 1. So
for any arbitrary effort path e = e1, . . . ,eT−2,eT−1,1. The payoff of the DM
at time T − 1 from her effort eT−1 is as follows. Suppose eT−2 ≤ eT−1.
Then it is u(eT−1)+λ+[u(eT−1)−u(eT−2)]+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))]. Hence
C(eT−1) = 1+ λ+− δλ+ > 0. Hence eT−1 = 1. Suppose eT−2 ≥ eT−1.
Then it is u(eT−1)−λ−[u(eT−2)−u(eT−1)]+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))]. Hence
C(eT−1) = 1+λ−− δλ+ > 0. Hence eT−1 = eT−2. But it is easy to verify
that payoff from 1 dominates payoff from eT−2. This implies that as long
as there is history of efforts, the DM’s future is the constant effort path of
1,1, . . . ,1. Given this, her period 1 problem is identical to the case with k = 1
and the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider the last two periods pattern eT−1,eT . According to, Fact 12
eT = 1. Assume that eT−1 ≥ eT−2. The DM’s outcome payoff from eT−1
is u(eT−1) + λ+(u(eT−1)− u(eT−2)) + δ [1+ λ+(1− u(eT−1))]. There is
C(eT−1) = 1+λ+−δλ+ > 0 always. It means that eT−1 = 1.
Now suppose that eT−1 ≤ eT−2. The DM’s payoff from eT−1 is u(eT−1)−
λ−(u(eT−2)−u(eT−1))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−1)). There is C(eT−1) = (1+
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λ−−δλ+). So if C(eT−1)> 0, then the DM’s effort at period T −1 is equal
to eT−2, otherwise, eT−1 = 0.
We analyse an effort that will be chosen by the DM. First, we compare
eT−1 = 1 and eT−1 = eT−2.
C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) ≶ C(eT−1|eT−1 = eT−2)
It is always true C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) > C(eT−1|eT−1 = eT−2). As a result, if
δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ , the DM’s effort is eT−1 = 1. However, the result changes when
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ . In this case, we compare C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) and C(eT−1|eT−1 =
0).
C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) ≶ C(eT−1|eT−1 = 0)
u(eT−1)+λ+(u(eT−1)−u(eT−2))+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))] ≶
u(eT−1)−λ−(u(eT−2)−u(eT−1))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))
1+λ+(1−u(eT−2)) ≶−λ−u(eT−2)+δλ+
For any δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ the DM’s effort at period T − 1 is 0,
otherwise it is eT−1 = 1. The above implies that the action (i.e., the effort)
path (eT−1,eT ) = (0,1) if δ >
1+λ++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
We can now state that if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is (eT−1,eT ) = (0,1),
otherwise (eT−1,eT ) = (1,1).
Now let’s consider the effort path that the DM has at T − 3 and T − 2.
Now suppose that the DM is at period T −2:
. . . ,eT−3,eT−2,eT−1,eT
Suppose the effort path is (eT−1 = 1,eT = 1), under condition δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Let’s consider the case where eT−2 ≥ eT−3, then the DM’s payoff from
eT−2 is u(eT−2)+λ+(u(eT−2)−u(eT−3))+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−2))]+δ 2(1).
Then C(eT−2) = 1+λ+−δλ+ > 0. This means that eT−2 = 1.
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Now consider the case where eT−2 ≤ eT−3. The DM’s payoff from eT−2
is u(eT−2)−λ−(u(eT−3)−u(eT−2))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−2))+δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = (1+ λ− − δλ+). So if C(eT−2) > 0, we have eT−2 = eT−3,
or if C(eT−2) < 0, then eT−2 = 0. The last case is impossible, because it
contradicts to the initial condition δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ .
We analyse which effort will be chosen by the DM. For this purpose,
we compare eT−2 = 1 and eT−2 = eT−3 the DM’s payoffs. We have
that C(eT−2|eT−2 = 1) > C(eT−2|eT−2 = eT−3). It is always true because
1+λ+(1−u(eT−3))> eT−3+δλ+(1−u(eT−3) for δ < 1+λ−λ+ . Therefore, in
this case, eT−2 = 1. As a result, (eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (1,1,1), if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Suppose the effort path is still (eT−1 = 1,eT = 1), but under conditions
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ and δ <
1+λ++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ .
Let’s consider the case where eT−2 ≥ eT−3. The DM’s payoff from eT−2
is u(eT−2)+λ+(u(eT−2)−u(eT−3))+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−2))]+δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = 1+λ+−δλ+ > 0, which is always true, therefore et−2 = 1. This
case contradicts to the condition of δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Now consider the case where eT−2 ≤ eT−3. The DM’s payoff from eT−2
is u(eT−2)−λ−(u(eT−3)−u(eT−2))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−2))+δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = (1+λ−− δλ+). So if C(eT−2) > 0, this case is excluded from
discussion because it contradicts to the initial condition. If C(eT−2)< 0, then
eT−2 = 0. As a result, (eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (0,1,1), if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ and δ <
1+λ+
λ+ .
Now consider the case where the DM’s effort path is (eT−1 = 0,eT = 1),
under condition δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ and δ >
1+λ++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ .
First, let’s consider eT−2 ≥ eT−3. The DM’s payoff from eT−2 is
u(eT−2)+λ+(u(eT−2)− u(eT−3))+ δ [0−λ−(u(eT−2)− 0)]+ δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = 1+λ+−δλ− > 0. This means that eT−2 = 1.
Now, let’s consider that eT−2 ≤ eT−3, and the DM’s payoff from eT−2 is
u(eT−2)−λ−(u(eT−3)− u(eT−2))+ δ (0−λ−(u(eT−2)− 0)+ δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = (1+λ−−δλ−)> 0. So we have eT−2 = eT−3.
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We analyse which effort will be chosen by the DM. Let’s compare eT−2 =
1 and eT−2 = eT−3. We show thatC(eT−2|eT−2 = 1)>C(eT−2|eT−2 = eT−3).
It is true because 1+ λ+(1− u(eT−3))− δλ− > u(eT−3)(1− δλ−)⇒ 1+
λ+−δλ− > u(eT−3)(1+λ+−δλ−). Hence, there is eT−2 = 1. As a result,
(eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (1,0,1), if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Comparing the DM’s payoffs from (eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (1,0,1) and
(eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (0,1,1) under condition δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , we have V (1,0,1)−
V (0,1,1) = 1 + λ+(1 − u(eT−4)) + δ (0 − λ−) + δ 2(1 + λ+) −
[
0 −
λ−(u(eT−4)) + δ (1+ λ+) + δ 2(1)
]
> 0, if λ+ is significantly higher than
λ− and the discount factor is not strong.
Now the DM is at T − 3, and the last three period effort path is
(eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (1,1,1), if δ , 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Let’s consider the case where eT−4 ≤ eT−3 then the DM’s payoff from
eT−3 is u(eT−3)+λ+(u(eT−3)−u(eT−4))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−3)))+δ 2+
δ 3. There is C(eT−3) = 1+λ+−δλ+ > 0 always, and eT−3 = 1.
Now consider the case where eT−4 ≥ eT−3. The DM’s payoff from eT−3
is u(eT−3)− λ−(u(eT−4)− u(eT−3)) + δ (1+ λ+(1− u(eT−3))) + δ 2 + δ 3.
There is C(eT−3) = 1+ λ−− δλ+. Then C(eT−3) > 0 and eT−3 = eT−4
if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ , otherwise C(eT−3) < 0 and eT−3 = 0 if δ >
1+λ−
λ+ . The last
case eT−3 = 0 if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ is impossible because it contradicts to the initial
conditions.
Let’s compare the DM’s payoffs for eT−3 = 1 and eT−3 = eT−4. Then 1+
λ+(1−u(eT−4))+δ +δ 2+δ 3 > u(eT−4)+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−4))). There
is 1+λ+(1−u(eT−4))> u(eT−4)+δλ+(1−u(eT−4)) and this is always true,
therefore, eT−3 = 1. Therefore, the effort path is (eT−3,eT−2,eT−1,eT ) =
(1,1,1,1), if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Suppose the following effort path for the last three periods is
(eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (1,0,1), if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ .
Let’s consider the case where eT−4≤ eT−3 then the DM’s payoff of eT−3 is
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u(eT−3)+λ+(u(eT−3)−u(eT−4))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−3)))+δ 2(0−λ−)+
δ 3(1+λ+). ThenC(eT−3) = 1+λ+−δλ+> 0 is always. There is eT−3 = 1.
Now consider the case where eT−4 ≥ eT−3 then the payoff from eT−3 is
u(eT−3)−λ−(u(eT−4)−u(eT−3))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−3)))+δ 2(0−λ−)+
δ 3(1+λ+). There isC(eT−3) = 1+λ−−δλ+. Then ifC(eT−3)> 0, eT−3 =
eT−4, otherwise if C(eT−3) < 0, and eT−3 = 0. The case eT−3 = eT−4 if
δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ is impossible because contradicts initial condition.
Let’s compare the DM’s payoffs for eT−3 = 1 and eT−3 = 0. 1+λ+(1−
u(eT−4))+δ −δ 2(λ−)+δ 3(1+λ+)≶−λ−u(eT−4)+δ (1+λ+)−δ 2λ−+
δ 3(1+λ+). There is 1+λ+(1−u(eT−4))+δ ≶−λ−u(eT−4)+δ (1+λ+).
As a result, eT−3 = 1, if δ <
1+λ++u(eT−4)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ , or eT−3 = 0, if δ >
1+λ++u(eT−4)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ .
As a result, (eT−3,eT−2,eT−1,eT ) = (0,1,0,1), if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ and δ >
1+λ++u(eT−4)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ .
Given previous analysis, the DM’s next two periods effort path also is
(eT−3,eT−2) = (0,1) if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ . However if δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is
(eT−3,eT−2) = (1,1).
The next step involves the proof of the following statements:
1. If δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is e
∗ = (0,1, . . . ,0,1);
2. If δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is e
∗ = (1,1,1, . . . ,1,1);
3. If δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is e
∗ = (0,1,1, . . . ,1,1);
(1) First, let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an equilibrium and consider
the statement S(n),T ≥ n ≥ 0 that e∗ = (e∗T−n,e∗T−(n−1), . . . ,e∗T−1,e∗T ) =
(0,1, . . . ,0,1) if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ . Now, we aim to prove that if the following
statement S(n) is true, the same path should be observed in the case of
S(n+2).
So now assume S(n) is true and check S(n+ 2). We infer from above
that S(1) and S(3) are true. OSDP and the proof above for S(1) render this
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argument in a straightforward way. So to see this, suppose S(n) is true. This
means irrespective of e∗n−1,e
∗
n−2, it must be that (e
∗
n,e
∗
n+1, . . . ,e
∗
T−1,e
∗
T ) =
(0,1, . . . ,0,1). From the proof for S(1), I know that irrespective of the value
of e∗n−3, it must be that (e
∗
n−2,e
∗
n−1) = 0,1. Hence, S(n+2) is true.
For now, ∀t > 2 the effort path is e= (0,1, . . . ,0,1). Suppose that the DM
is at t = 2. Consider the case, where e1 ≤ e2. The DM’s payoff from e2 is
u(e2)+ λ+(u(e2)− u(e1)+ δ (0−λ−(u(e2))+ δ 2(1+λ+)+ δ 3(0−λ−)+
Vδ ({0,1}). There is C(e2) = 1+λ+−δλ− > 0. It means that e2 = 1.
Next, we consider e1 ≥ e2. The DM’s payoff from e2 is
u(e2)−λ−(u(e1)− u(e2)+ δ (0−λ−(u(e2))+ δ 2(1+λ+)+ δ 3(0−λ−)+
Vδ ({0,1}). There is C(e2) = 1+ λ− − δλ− > 0. It means that e2 = e1.
Comparing the DM’s payoffs from e2 = 1 and e2 = e1, we have 1+λ+(1−
u(e1))+ δ (0− λ−(1))+ δ 2(1+ λ+)+ δ 3(0− λ−)+Vδ ({0,1})−
[
u(e1)+
δ (0− λ−(u(e1)) + δ 2(1+ λ+) + δ 3(0− λ−) +Vδ ({0,1})
]
= 1+ λ+(1−
u(e1))+δ (0−λ−(1))− [u(e1)+δ (0−λ−(u(e1))]> 0. Therefore, e2 = 1.
Suppose the DM is at t = 1. Let consider the effort e1. The DM’s
payoff from e1 is u(e1) + δ (1 + λ+(1− u(e1)) + δ 2(0− λ−(1) + δ 3(1 +
λ+)+ δ−(0−λ−)+Vδ ({0,1}). There are C(e1) = 1− δλ+. It means that
e1 = 0 if δ > 1λ+ . As a result, we proved that if δ >
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is
e = (0,1,0,1 . . . ,0,1).
(2) Next, let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an equilibrium and consider the
statement S∗(n),T ≥ n ≥ 0 such that e∗ = (e∗T−n,e∗T−(n−1), . . . ,e∗T−1,e∗T ) =
(1,1, . . . ,1,1) if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ . We are going to prove that if the following
statement S∗(n) is true, the same path we observe in the case of S∗(n+1).
So now assume S∗(n) is true and check S∗(n+ 1). From above it is
true for S∗(0) and S∗(1). OSDP and the proof above for S∗(1) render this
argument in a straightforward way. Suppose the statement S∗(n) is true. This
means irrespective of e∗n−1,e
∗
n−2, it must be that (e
∗
n,e
∗
n+1, . . . ,e
∗
T−1,e
∗
T ) =
(1,1, . . . ,1,1). From the proof of S∗(1), we know that irrespective of the
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value of e∗n−2, it must be that e
∗
n−1 = 1 as long as δ <
1+λ−
λ+ . Hence, S
∗(n+1)
is true.
Now suppose that the DM is at period t = 1, then the DM’s payoff
is Vδ (e1) = u(e1) + δ (1+ λ+(1− u(e1))) + δ 2(1) +V t≥3δ (1) = u(e1)(1−
δλ+) +V t≥3δ (1). As a result, if δ <
1
λ+ , e1 = 1, otherwise e1 = 0. To
summarise, if δ < 1λ+ , the effort path is e = (1,1, . . . ,1,1), or if
1
λ+ < δ <
1+λ−
λ+ the effort path is e = (0,1, . . . ,1,1). Putting all finding together, we
have for λ+ > λ− the optimal effort path is e = (1,1, . . . ,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ ; or
e= (0,1,1, . . . ,1,1) if 1+λ
−
λ+ > δ >
1
λ+ ; or e= (0,1,0,1, . . . ,0,1) if
1+λ−
λ+ < δ .
This completes the proof of proposition. 
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APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE: T = 3
Case k = 1
I suppose that the DM is a decentralized agent. The DM is at period T ,
then there is eT = 1 regardless of loss or gain (see Fact 12).
Now suppose that the DM is at period T −1:
. . . ,eT−2,eT−1,eT
Assume that eT−1 ≥ eT−2. The DM’s payoff from eT−1 is u(eT−1) +
λ+(u(eT−1)− u(eT−2))+ δ [1+λ+(1− u(eT−1))]. There is C(eT−1) = 1+
λ+−δλ+ > 0 always. It means that eT−1 = 1.
Suppose that eT−1 ≤ eT−2. The DM’s payoff from eT−1 is u(eT−1)−
λ−(u(eT−2)−u(eT−1))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−1)). There is C(eT−1) = (1+
λ−−δλ+). So if C(eT−1)> 0, then the DM’s effort at period T −1 is eT−2,
otherwise, eT−1 = 0. I analyse which effort will be chosen by the DM. First,
I compare eT−1 = 1 and eT−1 = eT−2.
C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) ≶ C(eT−1|eT−1 = eT−2)
It is always true. As a result, if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ , the DM effort is eT−1 = 1. However,
the result changes when δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ . In this case, I compare C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1)
and C(eT−1|eT−1 = 0).
C(eT−1|eT−1 = 1) ≶ C(eT−1|eT−1 = 0)
u(eT−1)+λ+(u(eT−1)−u(eT−2))+δ [1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))] ≶
u(eT−1)−λ−(u(eT−2)−u(eT−1))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−1))
1+λ+(1−u(eT−2)) ≶−λ−u(eT−2)+δλ+
For any δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ the DM’s effort eT−1 is 0, otherwise it
is eT−1 = 1. The above implies that the effort path eT−1,eT could be any of:
64
(eT−1,eT ) =

(1,1), if

δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ or
δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,1), if δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Now suppose that the DM is at period T = 1:
e1,e2,e3
Based on above discussions, suppose that at periods t = 2 and t = 3 the
effort path is (1,1).
The DM’s payoff at period T = 1 is u(e1)+δ (1+λ+(1−u(e1)))+δ 2(1).
There isC(e1) = 1−δλ+. So ifC(e1)> 0, the effort path is e1 = 1, otherwise
e1 = 0.
If the effort path at periods 2 and 3 is (0,1), the DM’s payoff at T = 1
is u(e1)+δ (0−λ−(u(e1)))+δ 2(1+λ+(1)). Then C(e1) = 1−δλ−. So if
C(e1)> 0 then e1 = 1, otherwise e1 = 0. Combining all possible effort paths
I have:
(e1,e2,e3) =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,1), if δ > 1λ+ and

δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ or
δ < 1+λ
++u(e1)(λ−−λ+)
λ+
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(1,0,1), if δ < 1λ− and

δ > 1+λ
++u(e1)(λ−−λ+)
λ+
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and

δ > 1+λ
++u(e1)(λ−−λ+)
λ+
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
65
The effort path (0,0,1) is impossible, because it self-contradicts.
Therefore,
(e1,e2,e3) =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,1), if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(1,0,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Further discussion about the effort path depends on the relation between
λ+ and λ−. To summarize:
If λ+ < λ−(1+λ−), the equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+
and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ . When δ >
1
λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the equilibrium effort path is
e∗ = (0,1,1).
As soon as λ+ > λ−(1+ λ−), the DM’s equilibrium effort path could
be: e∗ = (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ ; e
∗ = (0,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ; and
e∗ = (1,0,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
Case k = T
Now let consider the case where the DM is a social planner.
e1,e2,e3
Suppose that e1 ≤ e2. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)+λ+(u(e2)−u(e1)))+δ 2(1+λ+(1−u(e2))) =
= u(e1)(1−δλ+)+u(e2)δ (1+λ+−δλ+)+δ 2(1+λ+)
ThenC(e1)> 0 if δ < 1λ+ , otherwiseC(e1)< 0. The second termC(e2) is
always positive. As a result, it means that if δ < 1λ+ , the effort path is (1,1,1).
Otherwise, the effort path is (0,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ .
Suppose that e1 ≥ e2. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)−λ−(u(e1)−u(e2)))+δ 2(1+λ+(1−u(e2))) =
= u(e1)(1−δλ−)+u(e2)δ (1+λ−−δλ+)+δ 2(1+λ+)
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Then C(e1)> 0 if δ < 1λ− , otherwise C(e1)< 0. At the same time, C(e2)> 0
if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ , and C(e2)< 0 if δ >
1+λ−
λ+ . Combine them together:
e1 =

1, if δ < 1λ−
0, if δ > 1λ−
and e2 =

e1, if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+
0, if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
The above gives us the possible pattern of the effort paths:
(e1,e2,e3) =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1λ− and
1+λ−
λ+
(1,0,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(0,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
Now, I compare possible patterns to find true k = 3 commitment effort
path:
(e1,e2,e3)e1≤e2 =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+
(0,1,1), if δ > 1λ+
vs
(e1,e2,e3)e1≥e2 =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(1,0,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(0,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Further discussion depends on the relationship between λ+ and λ−.
Suppose that λ+ > λ−(1+λ−). If δ < 1λ+ , then (e1,e2,e3) = (1,1,1).
If δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ , two possible effort paths are possible (1,0,1) and
(0,1,1).
Vδ (1,0,1) ≶Vδ (0,1,1)
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1−δλ−+δ 2λ+ ≶ δ (1+λ+)⇒ δ 2λ+−δ (1+λ−+λ+)+1 ≶ 0
As can be seen, along this interval δ has non-linear representation (in this
case: quadratic). It means that both effort paths are possible. For simplicity,
take δ = 1, as a result, the DM effort path is (0,1,1). If δ = 0, then the DM’s
effort path is (1,0,1).
If δ > 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ , two possible effort paths are possible (0,0,1)
and (0,1,1).
Vδ (0,0,1) ≶Vδ (0,1,1)
As a result, the following δ 2λ+ < δ (1+λ+) is true. It means that the DM
takes (0,1,1).
Suppose that λ+ < λ−(1+λ−).
If δ < 1λ+ , then (e1,e2,e3)= (1,1,1). The effort path (e1,e2,e3)= (1,0,1)
is impossible because of self-contradiction.
Vδ (0,0,1) ≶Vδ (0,1,1)
As a result, δ 2λ+ < δ (1+λ+). It means that the DM takes (0,1,1), if δ >
1
λ+ .
Further discussion about the effort path depends on the relation between
λ+ and λ−. To summarize:
If λ+ < λ−(1+λ−), the equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+
and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ . When δ >
1
λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ the equilibrium effort path is
e∗ = (0,1,1).
As soon as λ+ > λ−(1+ λ−), the DM’s optimal effort paths could be:
e∗ = (1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ ; e
∗ = (0,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ; and e
∗ =
(1,0,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
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APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLE: T = 4
Case: k = 1
From Appendix 2 the following effort path for T −1,T periods is:
(eT−1,eT ) =

(1,1), if

δ < 1+λ
−
λ
δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1), if δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Now the DM is at period T − 2 and the previous effort path is (eT−1 =
1,eT = 1). Suppose eT−2 ≥ eT−3, then the DM’s payoff from eT−2 is
u(eT−2)+λ+(u(eT−2)− u(eT−3))+ δ [1+λ+(1− u(eT−2))]+ δ 2(1). Then
C(eT−2) = 1+λ+−δλ+ > 0. This means that eT−2 = 1.
Suppose that eT−2 ≤ eT−3, then the DM’s payoff from eT−2 is u(eT−2)−
λ−(u(eT−3)−u(eT−2))+δ (1+λ+(1−u(eT−2))+δ 2(1). Then C(eT−2) =
(1+λ−−δλ+). So ifC(eT−2)> 0, then I have eT−2 = eT−3. IfC(eT−2)< 0,
then eT−2 = 0.
Now I analyse which effort will be chosen by the DM. First, I compare
eT−2 = 1 and eT−2 = eT−3. I show that C(eT−2|eT−2 = 1)> C(eT−2|eT−2 =
eT−3). It is always true because 1+λ+(1−u(eT−3)) > u(eT−3)+δλ+(1−
u(eT−3) for δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ . Therefore, in the case of δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , eT−2 = 1.
The result changes when δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ . In this case I compareC(eT−2|eT−2 =
1) and C(eT−2|eT−2 = 0), that is C(eT−2|eT−2 = 1) ≶ C(eT−2|eT−2 = 0):
1+λ+(1−u(eT−3)) ≶ −λ−(u(eT−3))+ δλ+. The DM’s effort is eT−2 = 1
if δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−3)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ , otherwise eT−2 = 0.
Now suppose that the DM’s previous effort path is (eT−1 = 0,eT =
1). Suppose eT−2 ≥ eT−3, then the DM’s payoff from eT−2 is u(eT−2) +
λ+(u(eT−2)−u(eT−3))+δ [0−λ−(u(eT−2)−0)]+δ 2(1). Then C(eT−2) =
1+λ+−δλ− > 0. This means that eT−2 = 1.
Suppose that eT−2 ≤ eT−3, then the DM’s payoff from eT−2 is u(eT−2)−
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λ−(u(eT−3)−u(eT−2))+δ (0−λ−(u(eT−2)−0)+δ 2(1). Then C(eT−2) =
(1+λ−−δλ−)> 0. So I have eT−2 = eT−3.
Now I analyse which effort will be chosen by the DM. First, I compare
eT−2 = 1 and eT−2 = eT−3. I show that C(eT−2|eT−2 = 1)> C(eT−2|eT−2 =
eT−3). Then I have 1+λ+(1−u(eT−3))−δλ− > u(eT−3)(1−δλ−)⇒ 1+
λ+−δλ− > u(eT−3)(1+λ+−δλ−). As a result, eT−3 = 1.
(eT−2,eT−1,eT ) =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1+λ
−
λ
(0,1,1), if

δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−3)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ ,
δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(1,0,1), if δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Suppose that the DM is at period T = 1. The effort path at periods 2, 3
and 4 is (1,1,1). The DM’s payoff at period T = 1 is u(e1)+ δ (1+λ+(1−
u(e1)))+δ 2(1)+δ 3(1). ThenC(e1) = 1−δλ+. So ifC(e1)> 0, then e1 = 1,
otherwise e1 = 0.
Suppose the effort path at periods 2, 3 and 4 is (0,1,1), then the DM’s
payoff at period T = 1 is u(e1)+ δ (0− λ−(u(e1)))+ δ 2(1+ λ+(1))+ δ 3.
Hence C(e1) = 1−δλ−. So if C(e1)> 0 then e1 = 1, otherwise e1 = 0.
Suppose the effort path at periods 2, 3 and 4 is (1,0,1), then the DM’s
payoff at period T = 1 is u(e1)+δ (1+λ+(1−u(e1)))+δ 2(0−λ−(1))+δ 3.
If C(e1) = 1−δλ+ > 0, e1 = 1, otherwise e1 = 0.
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(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+ δ <
1+λ−
λ
(0,1,1,1), if δ > 1λ+ δ <
1+λ−
λ
(1,0,1,1), if

δ < 1λ− if
δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−3)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ ,
δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,0,1,1), if

δ > 1λ− if
δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−3)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ ,
δ < 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(1,1,0,1), if

δ < 1λ+
δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
(0,1,0,1), if

δ > 1λ+
δ > 1+λ
++u(eT−2)(λ−−λ+)
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+
The effort paths (0,0,1,1) and (1,1,0,1) are impossible.
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+ δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,1,1), if δ > 1λ+ δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(1,0,1,1), δ < 1λ− if δ <
1+λ+
λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,0,1), if δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
Further discussion about effort path depends on the relation between λ+
and λ−. To summarize:
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If λ+ < λ−(1+ λ−), the equilibrium effort pattern is e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if
δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ . When δ >
1
λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ the equilibrium effort
path is e∗ = (0,1,1,1). At the same time, if δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ , the
equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (0,1,0,1).
As soon as λ+ > λ−(1+ λ−), the DM’s equilibrium effort path could
be: e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ; e
∗ = (0,1,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and
δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ ; e
∗ = (1,0,1,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ ; and e
∗ = (0,1,0,1)
δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ .
Case: k = T
Since according to Fact 12 e4 = 1, I need to look only at e1,e2,e3. Suppose
that e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e3. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)+λ+(u(e2)−u(e1)))+
+δ 2(u(e3)+λ+(u(e3)−u(e2)))+δ 3(1+λ+(1−u(e3))) =
= u(e1)(1−δλ+)+u(e2)δ (1+λ+−δλ+)+
+u(e3)δ 2(1+λ+−δλ+))+δ 3(1+λ+)
Then C(e1) > 0 if δ < 1λ+ , otherwise C(e1) < 0. At the same time,
C(e2) > 0 and C(e3) > 0 always. If δ < 1λ+ , the effort path is (1,1,1,1),
otherwise the effort path is 0,1,1,1.
Suppose that e1 ≥ e2 ≥ e3. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)−λ−(u(e1)−u(e2)))+δ 2(u(e3)−λ−(u(e2)−u(e3)))+
+δ 3(1+λ+(1−u(e3))) = u(e1)(1−δλ−)+
+u(e2)δ (1+λ−−δλ−)+
+u(e3)δ 2(1+λ−−δλ+))+δ 3(1+λ+)
Then C(e1) > 0 if δ < 1λ− , otherwise C(e1) < 0. At the same time,
C(e2) > 0 is true always. There is C(e3) > 0 if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ and C(e3) < 0
if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ .
72
If δ < 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (1,1,1,1). If δ <
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is (1,0,1,1).
If δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (0,1,1,1). If δ >
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is (0,1,0,1).
Suppose that e1 ≤ e2 ≥ e3. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)+λ+(u(e2)−u(e1)))+
+δ 2(u(a3)−λ−(u(e2)−u(e3)))+δ 3(1+λ+(1−u(e3))) =
= u(e1)(1−δλ+)+u(e2)δ (1+λ+−δλ−)+
+u(e3)δ 2(1+λ−−δλ+))+δ 3(1+λ+)
Then C(e1) > 0 if δ < 1λ+ , otherwise C(e1) < 0. At the same time,
C(e2)> 0 is always. Then C(e3)> 0 if δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ , otherwise C(e3)< 0.
If δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (1,1,1,1). If δ <
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ the effort path is (1,1,0,1).
If δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (0,1,1,1). If δ >
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ the effort path is (0,1,0,1).
Suppose that e1 ≥ e2 ≤ e3. The DM’s payoff from e1 is
Vδ = u(e1)+δ (u(e2)−λ−(u(e1)−u(e2)))+
+δ 2(u(e3)+λ+(u(e3)−u(e2)))+δ 3(1+λ+(1−u(e3))) =
= u(e1)(1−δλ−)+u(e2)δ (1+λ−−δλ+)+
+u(e3)δ 2(1+λ+−δλ+))+δ 3(1+λ+)
Then C(e1) > 0 if δ < 1λ− , otherwise C(e1) < 0. At the same time,
C(e2)> 0 if δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , otherwise C(e2)< 0. Then C(e3)> 0 is always.
If δ < 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (1,1,1,1). If δ <
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is (1,0,1,1).
If δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ , the effort path is (0,1,1,1). If δ >
1
λ+ and
δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ , the effort path is (0,0,1,1).
As a result, the equilibrium effort path could be any of:
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(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if δ < 1λ+
(0,1,1,1), if δ > 1λ+
(1,1,1,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(1,0,1,1), if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,1,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,0,1), if δ > 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
(1,1,1,1), if) δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,1,1), if) δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+
(0,1,0,1), if δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+
The further discussion about effort path depends on the relation between
λ+ and λ−. To summarize:
If λ+ < λ−(1+λ−), the optimal effort path is e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+
and δ < 1+λ
−
λ+ . When δ >
1
λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ the optimal effort path is e
∗ =
(0,1,1,1). At the same time, if δ > 1λ+ and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ , the optimal effort path
is e∗ = (0,1,0,1).
As soon as λ+ > λ−(1+ λ−), the DM’s optimal effort path could be:
e∗ = (1,1,1,1) if δ < 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ; e
∗ = (0,1,1,1) if δ > 1λ+ and δ <
1+λ−
λ+ ; e
∗ = (1,0,1,1) if δ < 1λ− and δ >
1+λ−
λ+ ; and e
∗ = (0,1,0,1) δ > 1λ+
and δ > 1+λ
−
λ+ .
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4. CHAPTER
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I continue considering a DM who has Intertemporal
Reference Dependence (IRD). In addition I consider the NIEI (i.e.,
Negative Intertemporal Efforts Interdependence) and the PIEI (i.e., Positive
Intertemporal Effort Interdependence) cases along with IRD. Recall that in
the NIEI case, the DM’s effort in one period affects her effort level in the next
period. I am going to show that, surprisingly, regardless of “λ− - dominance”
and/or “λ+ - dominance”, any DM’s choice of effort path is the same and
strongly monotonic over the whole time horizon.
In the PIEI case, I first consider a λ−-dominant DM. I find that the DM
behaves like an IRI agent, who always chooses the highest possible effort level
every period, i.e., her effort path will be (1,1, ...,1,1). Next, I consider the
case λ+ > λ−. In this case too, the DM chooses a path where her effort level
is always at the maximum possible level after the first period, while her first
period effort (1) too is at the maximum possible level if her discount factor
is not sufficiently high, and (2) is less than the maximum possible level when
her discount factor is sufficiently high.
4.2 MODEL
In this chapter too, I follow the definitions and notations from Chapter 2
and I continue to consider a DM who takes part in the finite dynamic task,
where time is discrete and T < ∞, and for each period t = 1, . . . ,T , the
DM has to take a costless effort et = [0,1] that yields a payoff of u(et),
where u(et) is a direct utility. The DM’s period utility from the effort path
e = (e1, . . . ,eT ) is v(et) = u(et)+λ+(u(et)−u(et−1)) if u(et)> u(et−1) and
v(et) = u(et)− λ−(u(et−1)− u(et)) if u(et) < u(et−1), where λ+(u(et)−
u(et−1)) is a reference utility gain, and λ−(u(et−1)− u(et)) is a reference
utility loss. Combining all these elements, the discounted sum of utility
that incorporates reference utility gain and reference utility loss is defined
as follows:
Vδ (et ,et−1) = u(e1)+
T
∑
t=2
v(et ,et−1)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is her time discount factor.
I will continue to consider the IRD case, i.e., λ− > 0 and/or λ+ > 0.
4.3 THE NIEI CASE: u(et) = (1− et−1)et
The following lemma is immediate.
LEMMA 14: In the NIEI and IRD case, for any T and δ ∈ (0,1), the last
period effort is eT = 1.
Proof Suppose the DM is at period T . Then we have that eT = 1 regardless
of λ+ and/or λ−. To see this fix any immediate history hT−1 = eT−1 ∈ [0,1]
for period T .1 Then, given u(·) is monotone increasing, it cannot be that
eT < hT−1. Therefore, it also follows that eT takes its maximum value on
[0,1]. This completes the proof of lemma..
The following proposition characterises the DM’s effort path.
PROPOSITION 7: In the NIEI and IRD case, for any t > 1 and δ ∈ (0,1) the
DM’s effort path is et−1 ≤ et ≤ et+1.
1 See the definition Prior effort history in Chapter 3
76
Proof The proof of Proposition consists of two steps and invokes an inductive
argument.
1. Step 1 for any t > 1, if et−1 ≤ et+1, then et ∈ [et−1,et+1];
2. Step 2 for any τ ∈ [t, t+1], eτ ∈ [et ,et+1], where t ≥ 2 and τ < T .
Step 1: Suppose that the DM is at period t, and assume that the following
is true: . . . ≤ et−2 ≤ et−1 ≤ et+1 ≤ . . .. We want to show that the effort of
current period t is et ∈ [et−1,et+1].
First, let’s consider the DM’s payoff at period t:
V (et) = et(1− et−1)+

+λ+(et(1− et−1)− et−1(1− et−2))
−λ−(et−1(1− et−2)− et(1− et−1))
Suppose the DM chooses the effort et such that her current period outcome
is V (et) = et(1−et−1)+λ+(et(1−et−1)−et−1(1−et−2)). As long as et(1−
et−1)− et−1(1− et−2)> 0, there is et > et−1(1−et−2)(1−et−1) . Since et−1 ≤ et+1, there
is (1−et−2)(1−et−1) ≥ 1. Hence, we have et ≥ et−1.
Now consider the DM’s payoff in the next period, t + 1: V (et+1) =
δ (et+1(1−et)+λ+(et+1(1−et)−et(1−et−1))). Since et+1(1−et)−et(1−
et−1) > 0, we have et+1 >
et(1−et−1)
(1−et) . We know that et > et−1; therefore,
(1−et−1)
(1−et) ≥ 1. Thus, we have et+1 ≥ et .
Next, suppose that the DM decides to deviate and chooses her effort such
that the current period payoff is V (et) = et(1− et−1)−λ−(et−1(1− et−2)−
et(1−et−1)). This choice affects the DM’s next period payoff too as follows:
V (et+1) = δ (et+1(1− et)+

+λ+(et+1(1− et)− et(1− et−1)))
−λ−(et(1− et−1)− et+1(1− et)))
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CLAIM 13: In two consequent periods, the following combination {λ−,λ−}
is impossible.
Proof Suppose that the DM’s choice of et is such that the next period DM’s
payoff is V (et+1) = δ (et+1(1− et)− λ−(et(1− et−1)− et+1(1− et))). To
choose her effort et the DM compares her marginal benefit of that effort to
her marginal cost of it. To find the marginal benefit of effort et in period t, we
need to take the derivative of V (et)with respect to et . Then we obtain
∂V (et)
∂et =
(1−et−1)+λ−(1−et−1). Next, to find marginal cost of effort et , we need to
take the derivative of V (et+1) with respect to et . Then we obtain
∂V (et+1)
∂et =
δ (1− et−1)+λ−(1− et−1). Comparing marginal benefit to marginal cost of
chosen effort et reduces to
et+1
et−1−1 =
1+λ−+δλ−
δ (1+λ−) . With
1+λ−+δλ−
δ (1+λ−) > 0, the RHS
is positive while the LHS is negative. As this is impossible, the DM cannot
choose such an effort level in period t and thus encounter λ− in both periods
t and t+1.
CLAIM 14: In two consequent periods, the following combination {λ−;λ+}
is impossible.
Proof Suppose that the DM’s choice of et is such that the next period DM’s
payoff is V (et+1) = δ (et+1(1− et)+λ+(et+1(1− et))− et(1− et−1)). As in
the above claim’s proof, to choose her effort et the DM compares her marginal
benefit of that effort to her marginal cost of it. To find the marginal benefit
of effort et in period t, we need to take the derivative of V (et) with respect
to et . Then we obtain
∂V (et)
∂et = (1− et−1)+λ−(1− et−1). Likewise, next, to
find marginal cost of effort et , we need to take the derivative of V (et+1) with
respect to et . Then we obtain
∂V (et+1)
∂et = δ (et+1)−λ+(et+1−λ+(1− et−1)).
Comparing marginal benefit to marginal cost of chosen effort et reduces to
et+1
et−1−1 =
1+λ−+δλ−
δ (1+λ−) . With
1+λ−+δλ−
δ (1+λ−) > 0, the RHS is positive while the LHS
is negative. As this is impossible, the DM cannot choose such effort in period
t and thus encounter λ− in period t and λ+ in the subsequent period.
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As a result, for any period t, if et−1 ≤ et+1, et ∈ [et−1,et+1]. This
completes the proof of Step 1.
Now we will move to the next step of proof.
Step 2: In this step we will show that for any τ ∈ [t, t +1], eτ ∈ [et ,et+1],
where t ≥ 2 and τ < T .
Suppose that e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) is an equilibrium. Consider the
statement S(n) such that et+1 ≤ et+2 ≤ . . .≤ et+n. From Lemma 14 we know
that e∗T = 1 and this statement is true for n= 3, that is S(3) holds (see Step 1).
So, now suppose that if S(n) is true, then S(n+1) is also true ∀τ ∈ [t, t +1],
where t ≥ 2.
Since S(n) is true, it means that there is et ≤ et+1 ∀t ∈ [2,3, . . . ,n], where
n < T . Let’s take any τ such that τ ∈ [t, t+1]. According to the proof of Step
1, we have that eτ ∈ [et ,et+1]. Hence, S(n+ 1) is true. This completes the
proof of Step 2.
Putting all findings together, we establish that the DM’s effort path is
et−1 ≤ et ≤ et+1 for any t > 1. This concludes the proof..
Proposition 7 leads to the following interesting remark.
REMARK 2: In the NIEI with IRD case, regardless of λ− - dominance and/or
λ+ - dominance, any DM type’s choice of effort path is the same and weakly
monotonic over the whole time horizon.
The following lemma establishes that the DM’s choice of the last two
periods’ efforts is strictly monotonic: eT−1 < eT = 1. In other words, the DM
chooses her effort at period T −1 in order to make a very strong finish.
LEMMA 15: In the NIEI and IRD case, for any δ ∈ (0,1), eT−1 < eT = 1.
Proof The proof invokes OSDP (i.e., One-Step-Deviation Principle). Suppose
that eT−1 = eT = 1, that is the DM’s effort at period T − 1 is 1. The DM’s
payoff is V (eT−1 = 1) = 1(1−eT−2)+λ+(1(1−eT−2)−eT−2(1−eT−3))+
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δ (0− λ−(1(1− eT−2)− 0)). According to Proposition 7 this combination
{λ+,λ−} is impossible. Hence, there is eT−1 < eT = 1. This concludes the
proof.
The following Theorem 1 characterises the DM’s effort path in the case
of NIEI and IRD.
THEOREM 1: In the NIEI and IRD case, ∀t regardless of λ+ and λ− as long
as either λ+ > 0 and/or λ− > 0, et < et+1.
Proof We already know from previous results that the DM’s effort path is at
least weakly monotonic, i.e., e1 ≤ e2 ≤ . . . ≤ et−2 ≤ et−1 ≤ et ≤ et+1 . . . ≤
eT−1 ≤ eT (by Proposition 7). From Lemma 15 it is known that the last two
periods’ efforts are strongly monotonic, i.e., eT−1 < eT = 1.
Suppose that the DM is at period T −2. And the effort path is such that:
. . .eT−4 ≤ eT−3 ≤ eT−2 = eT−1 < eT = 1. We will show that this effort path
is impossible. Consider three different cases which partition all possibilities:
1) et = 12 ; 2) 0 < et <
1
2 ; and 3)
1
2 < et < 1.
First, we consider the case eT−2 = 12 . We know that eT−3 ≤ eT−2 = 12 . It
means that 1− eT−3 ≥ 1− eT−2 = 12 . Thus, the DM’s payoff is Vδ (eT−2) =
1
2(1− eT−3)+λ+(12(1− eT−3)− eT−3(1− eT−4))+δ (12(1− 12)−λ−(12(1−
eT−3)− 12(1− 12)))+δ 2(1(1− 12)+λ+(1(1− 12 − 12(1− 12))). However, this
combination of {λ−,λ+} contradicts Proposition 7. Therefore, et , et+1 if
et = 12 .
Next, let’s consider the case 12 < eT−2 < 1. Suppose that eT−2 =
1
2 + ε . It means that eT−3 ≤ eT−2 = 12 + ε , where ε ∈ (0, 12); therefore
1− eT−3 ≥ 1− eT−2 = 12 − ε . Hence, the DM’s payoff is V (eT−2) = (12 +
ε)(1−eT−3)+λ+(12 +ε)(1−eT−3)−eT−3(1−eT−4))+δ ((12 +ε)(12−ε)−
λ−((12 +ε)(1−eT−3)−(12 +ε)(12−ε))+δ 2(1(12−ε)+λ+((1(12−ε)−(12 +
ε)(12 − ε))). However, this combination of {λ−,λ+} contradicts Proposition
7. Therefore, et , et+1 if 12 < et < 1.
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Finally, we consider the case 0 < eT−2 < 12 . That is, the effort at period
T−2 is 12−ε , where ε ∈ (0, 12). It means that eT−3≤ eT−2 = 12−ε; therefore,
1− eT−3 ≥ 1− eT−2 = 12 + ε . Thus, the DM’s payoff is V (eT−2) = (12 −
ε)(1−eT−3)+λ+(12−ε)(1−eT−3)−eT−3(1−eT−4))+δ ((12−ε)(12 +ε)−
λ−((12−ε)(1−eT−3)−(12−ε)(12 +ε))+δ 2(1(12 +ε)+λ+((1(12 +ε)−(12−
ε)(12 + ε))). However, this combination of {λ−,λ+} contradicts Proposition
7. Therefore, et , et+1 if 0 < et < 12 .
Putting all of these findings together, we conclude that the DM’s
equilibrium effort path is strictly monotone increasing regardless of λ−
R λ+as long as either λ− or λ+ is greater than zero. This completes the
proof.
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Thus, Theorem 1 states that when the DM has Negative Intertemporal
Effort Interdependence (NIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Dependence
(IRD), then irrespective of “λ− - dominance” and/or “λ+ - dominance”the
DM’s choice of effort path is the same and strictly monotone increasing over
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the whole time horizon.
4.4 THE PIEI CASE: u(et) = et−1et
4.4.1 λ− - DOMINANT DM
Here, I will study PIEI when λ+ < λ−. The following lemma is immediate.
LEMMA 16: In the PIEI and λ− - dominant DM case, for any T and δ ∈
(0,1), the last period effort is eT = 1.
Proof Suppose the DM is at period T . Then we have eT = 1. To see this, fix
any immediate history hT−1 = eT−1 ∈ [0,1] for period T . Then, given u(·) is
monotone increasing, it cannot be that eT < hT−1. Therefore, it also follows
that eT takes its maximum value on [0,1]. The DM’s payoff is V (eT = 1) =
1eT−1+λ+(1e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2). Now suppose that the DM wants to deviate
and choose the effort eT = 1− ε , where ε ∈ (0,1]. Then the DM’s outcome
is either V (eT = 1− ε)+ = (1− ε)eT−1 + λ+((1− ε)e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2) or
V (eT = 1− ε)− = (1− ε)aT−1−λ−(e∗T−1e∗T−2− (1− ε)e∗T−1).
First, we compare V (eT = 1− ε)+ and V (eT = 1− ε)−. It is easy
to verify that V (eT = 1− ε)+ > V (eT = 1− ε)−. Comparing V (eT = 1)
and V (eT = 1− ε)+, we have V (eT = 1)−V (eT = 1− ε)+ = 1eT−1 +
λ+(1e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2)−
[
(1− ε)eT−1 + λ+((1− ε)e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2)
]
=
εeT−1 +λ+εe∗T−1 > 0. Consequently, the DM’s effort at T is eT = 1. This
completes the proof.
LEMMA 17: In the PIEI and λ− - dominant DM case, no optimal effort path
can have a period t > 1, such that et+1 = 1− ε , where ε ∈ (0,1].
Proof The proof invokes OSDP (i.e., One-Step-Deviation-Principle).
Pick any arbitrary t ∈ {2, . . . ,T − 1} and consider the effort path
e(et ,et+1) = (. . . ,{et−1},et ,et+1,{et+2}, . . .). The DM’s payoff is
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V jδ (e(et ,et+1)) = ∑
T
i= j δ i− jv(e(et ,et+1)). More specifically, her payoff
is V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) = 1et−1 + λ+[(1et−1− et−1et−2)+ δ (1+ λ+(1−
1et−1))+δ 2(1)+δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)).
Suppose that the DM’s effort at t + 1 is such that et+1 = 1− ε , where
ε ∈ (0,1]. Then, the DM payoff is either V tδ (e({et−1},1,1− ε,{1}))+ =
1et−1 +λ+[(1et−1− et−1et−2)+ δ ((1− ε)+λ+((1− ε)− 1et−1))+ δ 2(1+
λ+(1 − (1 − ε))) + δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)) or V tδ (e({et−1},1,1 − ε,{1}))− =
1et−1 +λ+[(1et−1− et−1et−2)+ δ ((1− ε)−λ−(1et−1)− (1− ε))+ δ 2(1+
λ+(1− (1− ε)))+δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)).
It is easy to verify that V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) > V tδ (e({et−1},1,1 −
ε,{1}))+ for all et−1 ∈ [0,1]. The difference is V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1}))−
V tδ (e({et−1},1,1 − ε,{1}))+ = 1et−1 + λ+[(1et−1 − et−1et−2) + δ (1 +
λ+(1 − 1et−1)) + δ 2(1) + δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1)) −
[
1et−1 + λ+[(1et−1 −
et−1et−2) + δ ((1 − ε) + λ+((1 − ε) − 1et−1)) + δ 2(1 + λ+(1 − (1 −
ε))) + δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1))
]
= εδ (1 + λ+ − εδ 2λ+) > 0. With λ− > λ+,
the LHS and RHS are positive. Hence, V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) >
V tδ (e({et−1},1,1− ε,{1}))+ for all et−1 ∈ [0,1].
Next, let’s compare V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) and V tδ (e({et−1},1,1 −
ε,{1}))−. Then we have V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) − V tδ (e({et−1},1,1 −
ε,{1}))− = 1et−1 + λ+[(1et−1 − et−1et−2) + δ (1 + λ+(1 − 1et−1)) +
δ 2(1) + δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1))−
[
1et−1 + λ+[(1et−1− et−1et−2) + δ ((1− ε)−
λ−(1et−1) − (1 − ε)) + δ 2(1 + λ+(1 − (1 − ε))) + δV t+3δ (e(et ,et+1))
]
=
δ + δλ+(1− et−1)− δ (1− ε) + δλ−(1− et−1 − (1− ε))− δ 2ελ+. With
λ− > λ+, we have V tδ (e({et−1},1,1,{1})) > V tδ (e({et−1},1,1− ε,{1}))−.
Putting all findings together, we conclude that no equilibrium effort path can
have a period t > 1, such that et+1 = 1− ε . This completes the proof.
LEMMA 18: In the PIEI and λ− - dominant DM case, for any T and
δ ∈ (0,1), e∗1 = 1.
Proof The proof uses One-Step-Deviation-Principle (OSDP). Suppose that
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e∗ = (e1,1,1, . . . ,1,1) is an equilibrium. If e1 = 1, the DM’s payoff is V (e1 =
1) = 1+δ (1)+δ 2(1)+V t≥3. Now suppose that the DM wants to deviate and
chooses the effort e1 = 1− ε , where ε ∈ (0,1]. The DM’s payoff is V (e1 =
1− ε) = 1− ε+δ (1− ε)+V t≥3. Comparing these two payoffs we have that
V (e1 = 1)−V (e1 = 1− ε) = 1+δ (1)−1+ ε−δ (1− ε)> 0. Thus, there is
e1 = 1. This completes the proof.
To generalise findings, the following proposition is immediate:
PROPOSITION 8: In the PIEI and a λ− - dominant DM case, for any T the
equilibrium effort path is e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
This means that when the DM has Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (PIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with
"λ− - dominance", then irrespective of her time discounting, the DM will
exert full effort over the whole time horizon.
4.4.2 λ+ - DOMINANT DM
In this section I will study PIEI when λ+ > λ−. The following lemmas will
be useful.
LEMMA 19: In the PIEI and λ+ - dominant DM case, for any T and
δ ∈ (0,1), eT = 1.
Proof Suppose that the DM is at period T . Then we have eT = 1. To see
this, fix any immediate history hT−1 = eT−1 ∈ [0,1] for period T . Then, given
u(·) is monotone increasing, it cannot be that eT < hT−1. Therefore, it also
follows that eT takes its maximum value on [0,1]. The DM’s payoff is V (eT =
1) = 1eT−1 +λ+(1e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2). Now suppose that the DM decides to
choose an effort eT = 1− ε , where ε ∈ (0,1]. Hence, the DM’s outcome
is either V (eT = 1− ε)+ = (1− ε)eT−1 + λ+((1− ε)e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2) or
V (eT = 1− ε)− = (1− ε)eT−1−λ−(e∗T−1e∗T−2− (1− ε)e∗T−1).
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Comparing V (eT = 1− ε)+ and V (eT = 1− ε)−, we have V (eT = 1−
ε)+ > V (eT = 1− ε)−. Next, we compare V (eT = 1) and V (eT = 1− ε)+.
Then we obtain 1eT−1 +λ+(1e∗T−1− e∗T−1e∗T−2)−
[
(1− ε)eT−1 +λ+((1−
ε)e∗T−1−e∗T−1e∗T−2)
]
⇒ εeT−1+λ+εe∗T−1 > 0. Hence, we have eT = 1. This
completes the proof.
LEMMA 20: In the PIEI and λ+ - dominant DM case, for T = 2, the effort
path is e = (1,1).
Proof Suppose that T = 2. According to Lemma 19, the DM’s effort at T
is eT = 1. Also, the DM’s payoff from e1 is V (e1) = e1+δ (1e1+λ+(1e1−
e1)) = e1(1+δ ). Hence, e1 = 1.
Suppose that the DM wants to deviate and choose an effort e1 = (1− ε),
where ε ∈ (0,1]. Then the DM’s payoff is V (e1 = 1−ε) = (1−ε)+δ (1−ε).
It is easy to verify that V (e1 = 1)>V (e1 = 1− ε). To see this, let’s consider
the following difference V (e1 = 1)−V (e1 = 1−ε) = 1+δ− [(1−ε)+δ (1−
ε)] = (1+ δ )ε > 0. Therefore, the effort path is e = (1,1). This concludes
the proof.
In the next section I will first proceed with examples.
4.4.3 EXAMPLE WITH T = 3 AND T = 4
Here, I will provide only outcomes of the cases T = 3 and T = 4. For details
of these examples, see Appendix 1. These examples provide a wide spectrum
of all possible effort paths that the DM can follow.
For T = 3, I have:
(e1,e2,e3) =

(1,1,1), if δ < 1+
√
1+4λ+
2λ+
(1− ε,1,1), if δ > 1+
√
1+4λ+
2λ+
where ε ∈ (0,1].
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Next, I consider the example with T = 4. This example is important
because it highlights effort paths that are different from those of the case
T = 3.
Regardless of value of λ+ and λ−, if ε < δ , the effort path is:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
In the case where, ε > δ , the effort path is:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
To generalise these findings, I introduce the following lemma:
LEMMA 21: In the PIEI and "λ+ - dominance" case, if λ+< 1+δδ 2 the optimal
effort path is e∗ = (1,1, . . . ,1,1).
Proof The proof involves an inductive argument and also invokes the
One-Step-Deviation Principle (OSDP). Let e∗ = (e∗1,e
∗
2, . . . ,e
∗
T ) be an optimal
solution and consider the statement S(n), T −1≥ n≥ 0 that
e∗T−n = e
∗
T−(n−1), . . . ,e
∗
T−1,e
∗
T = 1.
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From Lemma 19 we know that e∗T = 1 and hence S(0) is true. Consider S(1).
To prove it is true, OSDP ensures that blocking any deviation at period T −1
will suffice. So given e∗, the utility of the DM from e∗ given S(1) holds is
Vδ (eT−1 = 1|S(1))= 1eT−2+λ+(1eT−2−eT−2eT−3)+δ (1+λ+(1−1eT−2)).
Suppose that the DM wants to deviate and chooses eT−1 = 1 −
ε , where ε ∈ (0,1]. We consider two cases. First, Vδ (eT−1 = 1 −
ε|S(1))+ = (1 − ε)eT−2 + λ+((1 − ε)eT−2 − eT−2eT−3) + δ (1(1 − ε) +
λ+((1 − ε) − (1 − ε)eT−2)). Second, Vδ (eT−1 = 1 − ε|S(1))− = (1 −
ε)eT−2 − λ−(eT−2eT−3 − (1− ε)eT−2) + δ (1(1− ε) + λ+((1− ε)− (1−
ε)eT−2)). Comparing Vδ (eT−1 = 1|S(1)) and Vδ (eT−1 = 1 − ε|S(1))+,
we have Vδ (eT−1 = 1|S(1))−Vδ (eT−1 = 1− ε|S(1))+ = εeT−2(1+ λ+)+
εδ (1+ λ+(1− 1eT−2)) > 0. It is easy to verify that Vδ (eT−1 = 1|S(1)) >
Vδ (eT−1 = 1− ε|S(1))−. Hence, S(1) is true. Now, assume S(n) is true and
check S(n+ 1). OSDP and the proof above for S(1) render this argument
in a straightforward way. This means irrespective of e∗n−1, it must be that
e∗n = e∗n+1 = . . .e
∗
T = 1.
Now, let’s analyse S(n+ 1). For simplicity let’s denote T − (n+ 1) =
m. Then, Vδ (em = 1|S(n+ 1)) = 1em−1 + λ+(1em−1− em−1em−2) + δ (1+
λ+(1− 1em−1)) + δ 2(1) + δ 3(1) +V . Suppose that em = 1− ε . Then
the DM’s payoff is either Vδ (em = 1 − ε|S(n + 1))− = (1 − ε)em−1 −
λ−(em−1em−2 − (1 − ε)em−1) + δ ((1 − ε) + λ+((1 − ε))(1 − 1em−1)) +
δ 2(1 + λ+(1 − (1 − ε))) + δ 3(1) + V or Vδ (em = 1 − ε|S(n + 1))+ =
(1− ε)em−1 +λ+((1− ε)em−1− em−1em−2)+ δ ((1− ε)+λ+((1− ε))(1−
1em−1)) + δ 2(1+ λ+(1− (1− ε))) + δ 3(1) +V . It is easy to verify that
Vδ (em = 1|S(n + 1)) > Vδ (em = 1− ε|S(n + 1))−. Comparing Vδ (em =
1|S(n+ 1)) and Vδ (em = 1− ε|S(n+ 1))+, we have Vδ (em = 1|S(n+ 1)) >
Vδ (em = 1− ε|S(n+1))+ if λ+ < em−1+δδ 2−δ (1−em−1) . Hence, S(n+1) is true.
Now, consider the DM’s effort at period t = 1. Then her payoff specifically
is V (e1 = 1) = 1+ δ (1)+ δ 2(1)+V t≥4δ . Suppose the DM wants to deviate
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and choose e1 = 1− ε . The DM’s payoff then is V (e1 = 1− ε) = (1− ε)+
δ (1−ε)+δ 2(1+λ+(1−(1−ε)))+V t≥4δ . Comparing V (e1 = 1) and V (e1 =
1− ε), we have e1 = 1 if λ+ < 1+δδ 2 . This completes the proof.
This means that when the DM has Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with "λ+
- dominance", then if her discount factor is not sufficiently high, the DM will
exert full effort over the whole time horizon.
The following Lemma 22 characterises the DM’s effort path in the PIEI
and "λ+ - dominance" case.
LEMMA 22: In the PIEI and "λ+ - dominance" case, the effort et+1 never
goes below any effort level et .
Proof The proof invokes One-Step-Deviation-Principle (OSDP). Pick any
arbitrary t ∈ {2, . . . ,T −1} and consider the effort path
e(et ,et+1) = (e1, . . . ,et−1,et ,et+1,et+2, . . . ,eT−1,1).
Let V jδ ({et−1},e(et ,et+1),{et+2}) = ∑Ti= j δ i− jv(e(et ,et+1)) be the DM’s
payoff at period t.
Then specifically the DM’s payoff is V tδ ({1},e(1,1),{1}) = 1+ δ (1)+
δ 2(1) +V≥(t+3)δ . Suppose that the DM decides to deviate from this path
at period t + 1 with a choice of effort at this period et+1 = 1− ε , where
ε ∈ (0,1]. Consequently, the DM’s payoff is V tδ ({1},e(1,1− ε),{1}) =
1+ δ ((1− ε)1− λ−(1− (1− ε)1)) + δ 2(1(1− ε)) +V≥(t+3)δ . Comparing
these two payoffs we have V tδ ({1},e(1,1),{1}) > V tδ ({1},e(1,1− ε),{1}).
Then 1+ δ (1)+ δ 2(1)+V≥(t+3)δ −
[
1+ δ ((1− ε)1− λ−(1− (1− ε)1))+
δ 2(1(1− ε))+V≥(t+3)δ
]
= δ (ε +λ−ε + δ 2ε > 0. Therefore, the effort path
is e(et ,et+1) = ({1},e(1,1),{1})
Now consider the effort path ({et−1},e(et ,et+1),{et+2}) = ({1 −
ε},e(1,1),{1}). The DM’s payoff then is V tδ ({1− ε},e(1,1),{1}) = 1(1−
ε)+λ+(1(1− ε)− (1− ε)2)+δ (1+λ+(1− (1− ε)))+δ 2(1)+V≥(t+3)δ .
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Suppose the DM wants to deviate and considers two options to choose at
period t+1: the effort et+1 = 1−ε or an even lower effort et+1 = 1−η , where
η > ε and η ∈ (0,1]. If her effort is et+1 = 1− ε , then the DM’s payoff is
V tδ ({1−ε},e(1,1−ε),{1}) = 1(1−ε)+λ+(1(1−ε)− (1−ε)2)+δ (1(1−
ε))+δ 2(1(1− ε))+V≥(t+3)δ . If her effort is et+1 = 1−η , then her payoff is
V tδ ({1−ε},e(1,1−η),{1}) = 1(1−ε)+λ+(1(1−ε)−(1−ε)2)+δ (1(1−
η)−λ−(1(1− ε)−1(1−η)))+δ 2(1(1−η))+V≥(t+3)δ .
Comparing V tδ ({1−ε},e(1,1),{1}) and V tδ ({1−ε},e(1,1−ε),{1}), we
have 1(1−ε)+λ+(1(1−ε)− (1−ε)2)+δ (1+λ+(1− (1−ε)))+δ 2(1)+
V≥(t+3)δ −
[
1(1−ε)+λ+(1(1−ε)−(1−ε)2)+δ (1(1−ε))+δ 2(1(1−ε))+
V≥(t+3)δ
]
> 0. Therefore, the effort path is e(1,1).
Next, we compare V tδ ({1 − ε},e(1,1),{1}) and V tδ ({1 − ε},e(1,1 −
η),{1}). There is 1(1− ε)+λ+(1(1− ε)− (1− ε)2)+ δ (1+λ+(1− (1−
ε)))+δ 2(1)+V≥(t+3)δ −
[
1(1−ε)+λ+(1(1−ε)−(1−ε)2)+δ (1(1−η)−
λ−(1(1− ε)− 1(1− η))) + δ 2(1(1− η)) +V≥(t+3)δ
]
> 0. Therefore, we
obtain e(1,1).
Putting all findings together, we conclude that if the DM’s effort is 1 at
any t, the DM will never choose the lower effort in any subsequent periods.
Now suppose the DM’s effort at period t is et = 1−ε and the DM’s effort
path has the following pattern ({et−1},e(et ,et+1),{et+2}) = ({1− ε},e(1−
ε,1− ε),{1− ε}). Then the DM’s payoff is V tδ ({1− ε},e(1− ε,1− ε),{1−
ε}) = (1− ε)2+δ ((1− ε)2)+δ 2((1− ε)2)+V≥(t+3)δ .
Assume that DM wants to deviate and choose at period t + 1 the effort
et+1 = 1− η , where η > ε . The DM’s payoff is V tδ ({1− ε},e(1− ε,1−
η),{1−ε})= (1−ε)2+δ ((1−ε)(1−η)−λ−((1−ε)2−(1−ε)(1−η)))+
δ 2((1− ε)(1− η)) +V≥(t+3)δ . Comparing these two payoffs we have that
V tδ ({1− ε},e(1− ε,1− ε),{1− ε})>V tδ ({1− ε},e(1− ε,1−η),{1− ε}).
Putting all findings together, we conclude that if the DM’s effort is 1− ε
at any t the DM will never choose any lower effort in any subsequent periods.
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This completes the proof.
This Lemma 22 states that when the DM has Positive Intertemporal Effort
Interdependence (PIEI) and Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD) with
"λ+ - dominance", then the DM will never choose a lower effort in any
subsequent period.
REMARK 3: It turns out that neither of these cases considered in this chapter
(i.e., the NIEI and IRD case and the PIEI and IRD case) is robust to
incorporating diminishing marginal productivity of effort as well as disutility
of effort within a period.
4.5 CONCLUSION
Recall that in Chapter 2, the analysis fully pertained to the Intertemporal
Reference Independence (IRI) case. I have found that the DM behaves the
same way as in the ZIEI and PIEI cases by choosing the maximum possible
effort level. In the NIEI case, the DM alternates between the highest possible
effort level and zero effort level.
In Chapter 3, I analysed the Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD)
case. Unlike Chapter 2, in that chapter the DM compared her consecutive
outcomes in adjacent periods, and thus, her payoff at each period would
yield either a gain due to an increase in her output or a payoff loss due to
a decrease in her outcome, unless her outcomes were exactly the same in
consecutive periods. The main findings in that chapter were that (1) in the
“λ− - dominance” case, the DM behaves just like the DM in the ZIEI and IRI
case choosing an effort path of (1,1,1, ...,1,1) or slightly differently only in
the beginning by choosing an effort path of (0,1,1, ...,1,1), and (2) in the “λ+
-dominance” case, when λ+ does not exceed λ− by much, the DM behaves
just like the way she did in the λ− - dominant case; but in the case where λ+
exceeds λ− significantly, the DM exhibits different effort paths even with an
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up-and-down pattern throughout, as long as she will finish with an effort level
eT = 1. Thus, overall, when the DM moves from the ZIEI and IRI case to the
ZIEI and IRD case, whether or not λ− > λ+ starts mattering a lot. The DM
with λ− > λ+ still behaved very much like the DM with λ− = λ+ = 0, while
the DM with λ− ≤ λ+ may start behaving very differently especially as λ−
and λ+ diverge.
In this chapter I have considered the NIEI and IRD case and the PIEI
and IRD case. In the former case, I have obtained the surprising and striking
result that the DM’s equilibrium effort path is strongly monotone increasing
regardless of λ− R λ+ as long as either λ− and/or λ+ is greater than zero.
Thus, when the DM moves from the ZIEI and IRD case to the NIEI and IRD
case, whether or not λ− > λ+ does not matter at all. In addition, for the first
time one can observe a strictly monotone-increasing effort path by the DM
(and regardless of λ− R λ+). In the PIEI and IRD case, however, there is no
full convergence of the effort paths of the λ− -dominant and λ+ -dominant
DMs. Nevertheless, there is very strong resemblance between those paths.
The λ− -dominant DM exhibits an effort path of (0,1,1, ...,1,1) (i.e., just
like that of the DM in the ZIEI and IRI case) while the λ+ -dominant DM
exhibits either an effort path of (1,1,1, ...,1,1) (i.e., just like that of the DM
in the ZIEI and IRI case) or an effort path of (x,1,1, ...,1,1) where x > 0 (i.e.,
almost like that of the DM in the ZIEI and IRI case).
91
APPENDIX 1: EXAMPLES T = 3 AND T = 4
Case: Example T = 3
LEMMA 23: In the PIEI and λ+ - dominant DM case, for T = 3 and δ ∈
(0,1), the effort path is e = (1,1,1) if δ < 1+
√
1+4λ+
2λ+ , otherwise the effort
path is e = (1− ε,1,1), where ε ∈ (0,1].
Proof The proof invokes OSDP. According to Lemma 19, the last period
effort is eT = 1. Now suppose that the DM is at period T − 1. If the DM’s
effort at period t = 2 is e2 = 1, then the DM’s payoff is V (e2 = 1) = 1e1 +
λ+(1e1−e1)+δ (1+λ+(1−e1)) = e1+δ (1+λ+(1−e1)). Suppose that at
period t = 2 the DM decides to deviate and choose the effort e2 = 1−ε , where
ε ∈ (0,1]. Then the DM’s payoff is V (e2 = 1−ε) = (1−ε)e1−λ−(e1−(1−
ε)e1) + δ (1(1− ε) + λ+((1− ε)− (1− ε)e1)). Let’s compare V (e2 = 1)
and V (e2 = 1− ε). It is easy to verify that V (e2 = 1)−V (e2 = 1− ε) =
ε[e1(1+λ−)+δ +δλ+(1− e1)]> 0. Therefore, the DM’s effort is e2 = 1.
Next, suppose that the DM is at period t = 1, and her effort is e1 = 1.
The DM’s payoff is V (e1 = 1) = 1+ δ (1)+ δ 2(1). If her effort is instead
e1 = 1− ε , then the DM’s payoff is V (e1 = 1− ε) = (1− ε)+ δ (1− ε)+
δ 2(1+λ+(1− (1− ε))). Let’s compare V (e1 = 1) and V (e1 = 1− ε). Then
we have V (e1 = 1)−V (e1 = 1−ε) = ε(1+δ )−δ 2ελ+. Therefore, her effort
path is e= (1,1,1), if λ+ < 1+δδ 2 ; otherwise the effort path is e= (1−ε,1,1).
This completes the proof.
Case: Example T = 4
Now consider the optimal effort path for T = 4. According to Lemma 19,
the last period effort is e4 = 1. Consider the DM at period t = 3. If e3 = 1, the
DM’s payoff is V (e3 = 1) = 1e2 + λ+(1e2− e2e1)+ δ (1+ λ+(1+ λ+(1−
e2))). If she decides to choose an effort e3 = 1− ε instead, where ε ∈ (0,1],
then the DM’s payoff is either V (e3 = 1− ε)+ = (1− ε)e2+λ+((1− ε)e2−
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e2e1)+ δ (1− ε)(1+λ+(1+λ+(1− e2))) or V (e3 = 1− ε)− = (1− ε)e2−
λ−(e2e1− (1− ε)e2)+δ (1− ε)(1+λ+(1+λ+(1− e2))).
First, we compare V (e3 = 1) and V (e3 = 1− ε)−. It is easy to verify
that V (e3 = 1) > V (e3 = 1− ε)−. As a result, we have V (e3 = 1)−V (e3 =
1− ε)− = 1e2 +λ+(1e2− e2e1)+ δ (1+λ+(1+λ+(1− e2)))− a2 + εe2 +
λ−(e2e1)− λ−e2 + λ−εe2− δ + δε − δλ++ δλ+ε + δλ+e2− δλ+εe2 =
(λ+−λ−)e2(1− e1)+a1ε+λ−εe2+δε+δλ+ε−δλ+εe2 > 0.
Next, comparing V (e3 = 1) and V (e3 = 1− ε)+, we have V (e3 = 1)−
V (e3 = 1− ε)+ = εe2(1+λ+)+ εδ (1+λ+(1+λ+(1−e2)))> 0. Thus her
effort path for the last two periods is (e3,e4) = (1,1).
Now, suppose the DM is at period t = 2. Suppose that she decides to
choose the effort e2 = 1. Then her payoff is V (e2 = 1) = 1e1 + λ+(1e1−
e1)+ δ (1+λ+(1− e1))+ δ 2(1) = e1 + δ (1+λ+(1− e1))+ δ 2. However,
if the DM decides to choose e2 = 1− ε instead, then the DM’s payoff is
V (e2 = 1−ε) = (1−ε)e1−λ−(e1−(1−ε)e1)+δ (1−ε)(1+λ+(1−e1))+
δ 2(1+ λ+(1− (1− ε))). Let’s compare these two payoffs. Consequently,
we have V (e2 = 1)−V (e2 = 1− ε) = e1 + δ (1+λ+(1− e1))+ δ 2−
[
(1−
ε)e1−λ−(e1− (1− ε)e1)+δ (1− ε)(1+λ+(1−e1))+δ 2(1+λ+(1− (1−
ε)))
]
= ε
[
e1(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+(1−e1))−δ 2λ+
]
. Hence, we have that, if
e1(1+λ−)+ δ (1+λ+(1− e1))− δ 2λ+ > 0, the effort is e2 = 1; otherwise
e2 = 1− ε .
Next, suppose that the DM is at period t = 1. We have to consider two
subcases. The first one is e1(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+(1−e1))−δ 2λ+ > 0; that is
the effort path of the last three periods is (e2,e3,e4)= (1,1,1). Then, if e1 = 1,
the DM’s payoff at period t = 1 is V (e1 = 1) = 1+ δ (1) + δ 2(1) + δ 3(1).
Suppose the DM decides to deviate and choose the effort e1 = 1− ε . Then,
the DM’s payoff is V (e1 = 1−ε) = (1−ε)+δ (1−ε)+δ 2(1+λ+(1− (1−
ε))) + δ 3(1). When we compare V (e1 = 1) and V (e1 = 1− ε), we obtain
V (e1 = 1)−V (e1 = 1− ε) = ε(1+ δ − δ 2λ+). If 1+ δ − δ 2λ+ > 0, her
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effort is e1 = 1; otherwise e1 = 1− ε . To summarize, the DM’s effort paths
are:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
Now consider the second case, where e1(1+ λ−) + δ (1+ λ+(1− e1))−
δ 2λ+< 0; that is the last three periods’ effort path is (e2,e3,e4)= (1−ε,1,1).
Assume that the DM’s effort at period t = 1 is e1 = 1. As a result, the DM’s
payoff is V (e1 = 1) = 1+ δ ((1− ε)1− λ−(1− (1− ε)))+ δ 2(1(1− ε))+
δ 3(1+λ+(1− (1−ε))) = 1+δ ((1−ε)−λ−ε)+δ 2(1−ε)+δ 3(1+λ+ε).
Now suppose that she decides to take an effort e1 = 1− ε instead. Then, the
DM’s payoff is V (e1 = 1− ε) = (1− ε)+ δ ((1− ε)2− λ−((1− ε)− (1−
ε)2))+ δ 2(1(1− ε)+λ+((1− ε)− (1− ε)2))+ δ 3(1+λ+(1− (1− ε))) =
(1−ε)+δ (1−ε)((1−ε)−λ−ε)+δ 2(1−ε)(1+λ+ε)+δ 3(1+λ+ε). Let’s
compare V (e1 = 1) and V (e1 = 1− ε). The we have V (e1 = 1)−V (e1 =
1− ε) = ε(1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)). If 1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−
δ 2λ+(1− ε) > 0, her effort is e1 = 1; otherwise her effort is e1 = 1− ε .
Putting all together, we have:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1− ε,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)> 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
Listing all effort paths, we have:
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(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
(1,1− ε,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)> 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
Regardless of the size of λ+ and λ−, if ε < δ , then the effort path (1,1−
ε,1,1) is self-contradicted. In the case where ε > δ the effort paths (1,1−
ε,1,1) and (1− ε,1,1,1) are self-contradicted. To summarise, if ε < δ , the
effort path is:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ < 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
In the case where ε > δ , the effort path is:
(e1,e2,e3,e4) =

(1,1,1,1), if

1+λ−+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
1+δ −δ 2λ+ > 0
(1− ε,1− ε,1,1), if

(1− ε)(1+λ−)+δ (1+λ+ε)−δ 2λ+ < 0
1+δ (1− ε(1+λ−))−δ 2λ+(1− ε)< 0
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5. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have considered a forward-looking and potentially impatient
DM who has to choose an effort level in each period - where as usual a
higher effort level generates a higher level of outcome - in a fully dynamic
history-dependent environment by simultaneously considering past, present
and future, the main focus being on the finite-horizon setup.
To that end, my analysis has been based on the following key concepts.
(1) the Zero Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (ZIEI), where the DM’s
effort in one period does not have any negative or positive impact on her effort
in the ensuing period,
(2) the Negative Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (NIEI), where
fatigue due to higher effort of the DM in one period affects her effort level
of the next period negatively,
(3) the Positive Intertemporal Effort Interdependence (PIEI), where a
higher effort of the DM in one period affects her effort level in the next period
positively,
(4) the Intertemporal Reference Independence (IRI), where the DM does
not compare her consecutive outcomes in adjacent periods, and consequently
the DM does not encounter any loss aversion or any gain fondness between
adjacent periods due to fluctuations in the values of her outcomes in
consecutive periods,
(5) the Intertemporal Reference Dependence (IRD), where the DM
compares her consecutive outcomes in adjacent periods, and thus, apart from
her standard direct utility from the outcome of her choice of effort in each
period, the DM also obtains a reference payoff gain from an increase in the
outcome and/or suffers a reference payoff loss from a decrease in the outcome,
unless she encounters identical outcomes in consecutive periods,
(6) the Intertemporal Gain Fondness, where the gain-fondness coefficient
λ+ > 0 of the DM determines the extent of the reference utility increase she
experiences from her intertemporal outcome increment, and
(7) the Intertemporal Loss Aversion, where the loss-aversion coefficient
λ− > 0 of the DM determines the extent of the reference utility decrease she
experiences from that intertemporal outcome drop.
Chapter 1 of this thesis has included the Introduction with relevant
literature.
My main results in the following chapters can be summarized as follows:
In Chapter 2, I have focused on the IRI setup. I have considered the (i)
ZIEI and IRI, (ii) NIEI and IRI, and (iii) PIEI and IRI cases. I showed that in
the ZIEI and IRI case, the DM always chooses the maximum possible effort
level. In the NIEI and IRI case, I showed that the DM starts with the highest
possible effort level and then follows up with the lowest possible effort level,
and so on, thus following this alternating up-and-down pattern throughout.
In the PIEI and IRI case, it turned out that the DM still picks the maximum
possible effort level every period as in the ZIEI and IRI case.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I have considered a DM who exhibits IRD. In Chapter
3, I have first considered the ZIEI in conjunction with IRD. In that context,
I have first considered the “λ−-dominant” case. I have found that the DM
behaves just like the DM in the ZIEI and IRI when λ+ is relatively low, in that
she picks the highest possible effort level every period. When λ+ is relatively
high and she does not discount the future much, however, the DM starts with
a low level of effort at the initial period, but behaves just like a standard DM
thereafter, by picking the highest effort level every period from then on. I
have then considered the “λ+-dominant” case. In this case, my results have
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turned out to be the same as those of the λ+≤ λ− case whenever λ+ does not
exceed λ− by much. When λ+ exceeds λ− significantly, however, a much
richer dynamic could arise, and fluctuating or volatile efforts could become
standard under some parameters.
In Chapter 4, I have kept considering a DM who has IRD. I have
considered the NIEI and PIEI cases along with IRD.
In the NIEI and IRD case, it turns out that regardless of the extent of
her intertemporal loss aversion and/or the extent of her intertemporal gain
fondness, any DM type’s choice of effort path is the same and strongly
monotonic over the entire time horizon. In the PIEI and IRD case, I first
consider a λ−-dominant DM. I find that the DM behaves like a standard DM,
who always chooses the highest effort level every period. Next, I consider a
λ+-dominant DM. In this case too, the DM chooses a path where her effort
level is always at the maximum possible level after the first period, while her
first period effort (i) too is at the maximum possible level if her discount factor
is not high, and (ii) is less than the maximum possible level when her discount
factor is high.
Overall, with IRI, there is already significant variation between the DM’s
effort paths depending on whether ZIEI and PIEI (choosing the maximum
possible effort level all the way) or NIEI (alternating between the highest and
lowest possible levels). With IRD, even within ZIEI there is a significant but
even richer variation between the DM’s effort paths depending on whether
λ− > λ+ or not. A λ−-dominant DM always chooses the maximum
possible effort level, while λ+-dominant DM may either always choose the
maximum possible effort level or alternate between the highest and lowest
possible levels, among other variations of those paths. With IRD with
NIEI, surprisingly the DM’s effort path becomes strictly monotone increasing,
regardless of λ− R λ+. With IRD and PIEI, however, there is no full
convergence of the effort paths of the λ− -dominant and λ+ -dominant DMs,
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although there is very strong resemblance between the effort paths of the of
the λ− -dominant and λ+ -dominant DMs.
99
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Abd-Elfattah, H, Abdelazeim, F & Elshennawy, S 2015, ’Physical and
Cognitive Consequences of Fatigue: A Review’, Journal of Advanced
Research, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 351-358.
[2] Akerlof, G & Yellen, J 1990, ’The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and
Unemployment’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 105, no. 2,
pp. 255-283.
[3] Ariely, D, & Carmon, Z 2003, ’Summary Assessment of Experiences:
The Whole is Different from the Sum of Its Parts’, In Loewenstein, G.,
Read, D., Baumeister, R. (Eds.), Time and Decision: Economic and
Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, Russell Sage, New
York, pp. 323-350.
[4] Ariely, D, Loewenstein, G & Prelec, D 2003, ’Coherent Arbitrariness:
Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences’, The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 118, no. 1, pp. 73-105.
[5] Arrow, K 1963, ’The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing’,
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 155-173.
[6] Barberis, N & Huang, M 2001, ’Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion
and Individual Stock Returns’, Journal of Finance, vol. 56, no. 4, pp.
1247-1292.
[7] Barberis, N, Huang, M & Santos, T 2001, ’Prospect Theory and Assets
Prices’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, no.1, pp. 1-53.
[8] Bateman, I, Munro, A, Rhodes, B, Starmer, C & Sugden, R 1997, ’A
Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences’ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, vol. 112, no. 2, pp. 479-505.
[9] Bleichrodt, H 2007, ’Reference-Dependent Utility with Shifting
Reference Points and Incomplete Preferences’, Journal of Mathematical
Psychology, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 266-276.
[10] Chapman, S 1909, ’Hours of Labour’, The Economic Journal, vol. 19,
no. 75, pp. 353-373.
[11] Dragone, D 2009, ’I am Getting Tired: Effort and Fatigue in
Intertemporal Decision-Making’, Journal of Economic Psychology, vol.
30, no. 4, pp. 552-562.
[12] Dorrian J, Lamond N & Dawson D 2000, ’The Ability to Self-Monitor
Performance When Fatigued’, Journal of Sleep Research, vol. 9, no. 2,
pp. 137-144.
[13] Dunn, L 1996, ’Loss Aversion and Adaptation in the Labor Market:
Empirical Indifference Functions and Labor Supply’, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 441-450.
[14] Fehr, E, Goettey, L & Lienhardz, M 2013, ’Loss Aversion and Effort:
Evidence from a Field Experiment’, retrieved 27 October 2016,
< htt p : //www.iza.org/con f erence_ f iles/ESSLE2013/ >.
[15] Florence, P 1924, ’Economics of Fatigue and Unrest’, Routledge, Taylor
and Francis Group, London & New York.
[16] Fuhrer, J 2000, ’Habit Formation in Consumption and Its Implications
for Monetary-Policy Models’, The American Economic Review, vol. 90,
no. 3, pp. 367-390.
101
[17] Garcia-Sanchez, A & Vazquez-Mendez, M 2005, ’The Timing of Work
in a General Equilibrium Model With Shift Work’, Investigaciones
Economicas, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 149-179.
[18] Gilboa, I 1989, ’Expectation and Variation in Multi-Period Decisions’,
Econometrica, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 1153-1169.
[19] Kahneman, D 1973, ’Attention and Effort’, Englewood Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
[20] Kahneman,D & Tversky, A 1979, ’Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk’, Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 263-291.
[21] Kahneman, D, Knetsch J & Thaler, R 1990, ’Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem’, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 98, no. 6, pp. 1325-1348.
[22] Kahneman,D & Tversky, A 1991, ’Economic Analysis and the
Psychology of Utility: Applications to Compensation Policy’, The
American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 341-346.
[23] Köszegi, B & Rabin, M 2006, ’A Model of Reference-Dependent
Preferences’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121, no. 4, pp.
1133-1165.
[24] Köszegi, B & Rabin, M 2007, ’Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes’,
The American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 4, pp. 1047-1073.
[25] Levitt, S, List, J & Syverson, C 2012, ’Toward an Understanding of
Learning by Doing: Evidence from an Automobile Assembly Plant’,
NBER Working Paper, no. 18017, pp. 1-51.
[26] Loewenstein, G 1988, ’Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice’,
Management Science, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 200-214.
102
[27] Loewenstein, G 1987, ’Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed
Consumption’, The Economic Journal, vol. 97, no. 387, pp. 666-684.
[28] Loewenstein, G & Prelec, D 1991, ’Negative Time Preference’, The
American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, pp. 347-352.
[29] Loewenstein, G & Prelec, D 1992, ’Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice:
Evidence and Interpretation’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
107, no. 2, pp. 573-597.
[30] Loewenstein, G & Prelec, D 1993, ’Preferences for Sequences of
Outcomes’, Psychological Review, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 91-108.
[31] Loewenstein, G & Sicherman, N 1991, ’Do Workers Prefer Increasing
Wage Profiles?’, Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 67-84.
[32] Lucas, R 1988, ’On the Mechanics of Economic Development’, Journal
of Monetary Economics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 3-42.
[33] Lundberg, E 1961, ’Produktivitet och Räntabilitet’, Norstedt & Söner,
Stockholm.
[34] Marchetti, D & Nucci, F 2001, ’Labor Effort Over the Business Cycle’,
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Working paper, no.
424, pp. 1-34.
[35] Markowitz, H 1952, ’Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance, vol. 7,
no. 1, pp. 77-91.
[36] Marshall, A 1920, ’Principles of Economics’, Macmillan and Co,
London.
[37] Medoff, J & Abraham, K 1980, ’Experience, Performance, and
Earnings’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 95, no. 4, pp.
703-736.
103
[38] Montgomery, P, Pyne, D, Hopkins, W, Dorman, J, Cook, K & Minahan,
C 2008, ’The Effect of Recovery Strategies on Physical Performance
and Cumulative Fatigue in Competitive Basketball’, Journal of Sports
Sciences, vol. 26, no. 11, pp. 1135-1145.
[39] Rogers N, Dorrian J & Dinges, D 2003, ’Sleep, Waking and
Neurobehavioural Performance’, Frontiers in Bioscience, vol. 8, no.
1174, pp. 1056-1067.
[40] Rozen, K 2010, ’Foundations of Intrinsic Habit Formation’,
Econometrica, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 1341-1373.
[41] Ryvkin, D 2011, ’Fatigue in Dynamic Tournaments’, Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1011-1041.
[42] Sahlin, K, Tonkonogi, M & Söderlund K 1998, ’Energy Supply and
Muscle Fatigue in Humans’, Acta Physiologica, vol. 163, no 3, pp.
261-266.
[43] Schmidt, U 2003, ’Reference Dependence in Cumulative Prospect
Theory’, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, vol. 47, no. 4, pp.
122-131.
[44] Schmidt, U, Starmer, C & Sugden, R 2008, ’Third-Generation Prospect
Theory’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 203-223.
[45] Shalev, J 1997, ’Loss Aversion in Multi Periods’, Mathematical Social
Science, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 203-266.
[46] Shalev, J 2000, ’Loss Aversion Equilibrium’, International Journal of
Game Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 269-287.
[47] Sugden, R 2003, ’Reference-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility’,
Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 111, no. 2, pp. 172-191.
104
[48] Tversky, A & Kahneman, D 1991, ’Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:
A Reference-Dependent Model’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 106, no. 4, pp. 1039-1062.
[49] Tversky, A & Kahneman, D 1992, ’Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty’, Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 297-323.
[50] Varey, C & Kahneman, D 1992, ’The Integration of Aversive
Experiences over Time: Normative Considerations and Lay Intuitions’,
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 169-186.
[51] Vernon, H 1921, ’Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency’, Routledge, London
& E.P. Dutton, New York.
[52] Wakker, P & Tversky, A 1993, ’An Axiomatization of Cumulative
Prospect Theory’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 7, no. 2, pp.
147-176.
[53] Wakker, P 2005, ’Reference Dependence, Initial Wealth, and Utility of
Income: A Reply to Cox & Sadiraj’s Criticism of Rabin’s Calibration
theorem’, Working Paper, Erasmus University Rotterdam,
< htt p : //people. f ew.eur.nl/wakker/ >.
105
